{"id":3529,"date":"2026-04-11T13:05:51","date_gmt":"2026-04-11T13:05:51","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/csr-italia.org\/?p=3529"},"modified":"2026-11-14T09:38:10","modified_gmt":"2026-11-14T08:38:10","slug":"latin-america-confidential-report","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/csr-italia.org\/en\/rapporto-riservato-america-latina\/","title":{"rendered":"Latin America Report \u2014 December 2025 (archive)"},"content":{"rendered":"<p class=\"has-large-font-size wp-block-paragraph\">Report on organised crime and state capacity \u2014 archive version<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph translation-block\"><p><em><strong>Archive document (December 2025).<\/strong> This is the original version of the report, superseded by the later systemic reading: <a href=\"https:\/\/csr-italia.org\/en\/latin-america-crisis-of-the-state\/\">Latin America: when criminal violence redefines the State<\/a>. Retained for documentary continuity.<\/em><\/p><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>The later systemic reading<\/strong><br><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph translation-block\" style=\"padding-top:0;padding-bottom:var(--wp--preset--spacing--30);padding-left:var(--wp--preset--spacing--50)\"><strong><em><a href=\"https:\/\/csr-italia.org\/en\/latin-america-crisis-of-the-state\/\">Latin America: when criminal violence redefines the State<\/a><\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>For the updated systemic framing, see the Latin America Macro-Area (Global System Assessment):<\/strong><br><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-medium-font-size wp-block-paragraph translation-block\" style=\"padding-bottom:var(--wp--preset--spacing--30);padding-left:var(--wp--preset--spacing--55)\"><strong><em><a href=\"https:\/\/csr-italia.org\/en\/strategic-analysis-latin-america\/\" title=\"Strategic analysis \u2014 Latin America Macro-Area\" target=\"_self\">Latin America Macro-Area<\/a><\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong><strong>Executive summary<\/strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph translation-block\">Latin America remains one of the areas of greatest strategic instability worldwide. The analysis of the second half of 2025 points to a marked escalation across every dimension of the threat \u2014 transnational organised crime, hybrid terrorism, cyber-warfare and external geopolitical penetration.<br><br>\n<strong>Overall risk assessment: critical\u2013high.<\/strong><br><br>\nThe deterioration of the security situation in key countries such as Mexico and Ecuador has reached levels comparable to non-international armed conflicts (NIAC), with direct implications for regional stability and Western strategic interests.<\/p><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>1. TRANSNATIONAL ORGANISED CRIME<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>1.1 General overview<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Latin America represents 9% of the world population but generates 33% of global homicides.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">According to the latest estimates, 40% of these murders are directly attributable to criminal organizations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Key figures 2025<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Regional homicide rate: 22.8 per 100,000 inhabitants&nbsp;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Active criminal organizations: over 200 transnational groups&nbsp;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Narcotics trafficking market: estimated at $150-200 billion per year&nbsp;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Territorial control: 30-35% of Mexican territory under cartel influence&nbsp;<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>1.2 Mexico \u2013 NIAC Analysis (Non-International Armed Conflict)<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Legal classification<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The Geneva Academy (<a href=\"https:\/\/www.rulac.org\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">RULAC<\/a>) and several international research centres have confirmed the existence of non-international armed conflicts between the Mexican government and at least two cartels:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ol start=\"1\" class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Jalisco Nueva Generaci\u00f3n (CJNG) cartel&nbsp;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Sinaloa Cartel (in its factions Los Chapitos and Los Mayos)&nbsp;<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>NIAC criteria met<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Intensity of conflict: 33,341 homicides in 2018 (peak), 23.3 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2024&nbsp;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Organization of the parties: permanent military structures, chain of command, territorial control&nbsp;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Prolonged confrontation: sustained violence since 2006&nbsp;<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Arsenal and military capabilities<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Weapons in the possession of the cartels<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Barrett .50 calibre rifles (anti-materiel)&nbsp;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>AK-47 and variants (predominant)&nbsp;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Browning .50 heavy machine guns&nbsp;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Rocket launchers and RPG grenades&nbsp;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Improvised explosive devices (IEDs)&nbsp;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Innovation 2025: Specialized FPV drone units (CJNG) with tactics learned from the Ukrainian conflict&nbsp;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Modified armored vehicles (narco-tank)&nbsp;<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Sources of supply<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>USA: 70% of the weapons come from legal purchases that are subsequently trafficked (over 13 million unregistered weapons in circulation)&nbsp;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Small independent retailers: 16 times more likely to sell assault weapons, 60 times more likely to sell sniper rifles&nbsp;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Black market in Central and South America&nbsp;<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Territorial control<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Sinaloa Cartel<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Controlled states: Sinaloa, Baja California, Durango, Sonora, Chihuahua (primary)&nbsp;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Transnational presence: over 40 countries&nbsp;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Activities: fentanyl (97% purity record 2025), methamphetamine, cocaine, heroin&nbsp;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Fragmentation: internal war between Los Chapitos and Los Mayos from 2024&nbsp;<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>CJNG<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Aggressive territorial expansion: Jalisco, Guanajuato, Michoac\u00e1n, Veracruz&nbsp;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>International presence: over 40 countries&nbsp;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Tactics: extremely violent, systematic use of force&nbsp;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Potential strategic alliance between Los Chapitos and the CJNG against Los Mayos&nbsp;<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Territorial dynamics<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Direct control: about 30-35% of the Mexican territory&nbsp;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Contested zones: additional 20-25%&nbsp;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Infrastructure under influence: ports, airports, border crossings&nbsp;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Michoac\u00e1n: doubling of clashes between law enforcement and armed groups (first 11 months of 2025 vs 2024)&nbsp;<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Drug export channels<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Primary routes to the USA<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Land crossings: Tijuana-San Diego, Ciudad Ju\u00e1rez-El Paso, Nuevo Laredo-Laredo&nbsp;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Maritime: Pacific and Gulf of Mexico&nbsp;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Air: small aircraft and drones&nbsp;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Cross-border underground tunnels&nbsp;<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Synthetic production<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Fentanyl: Mexico the main global producer for the US market&nbsp;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Clandestine laboratories in remote rural areas&nbsp;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Chemical precursors: mainly from China and India&nbsp;<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Diversification of activities<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Extortion, kidnappings, human trafficking&nbsp;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Oil theft (huachicol)&nbsp;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Illegal mining&nbsp;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Infiltration of public tenders&nbsp;<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Killings and modus operandi<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>60-70% of murders in Mexico attributed to organized crime&nbsp;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Targeted massacres for territorial intimidation&nbsp;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Murders of public officials: mayors, judges, police officers, journalists&nbsp;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Systematic use of public executions for social control&nbsp;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Sexual violence as a tool of war&nbsp;<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Government response<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>President Claudia Sheinbaum (2024-present):<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Abandonment of AMLO's \u201chugs, not bullets\u201d strategy&nbsp;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Intensified military operations: Operation \u201cMichoac\u00e1n Plan for Peace and Justice\u201d&nbsp;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Over 120 arrests in November 2025 (including \u201cEl Licenciado\u201d \u2013 CJNG)&nbsp;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Massive deployment of the National Guard&nbsp;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Intelligence-driven plan to dismantle networks&nbsp;<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Operational challenges<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Endemic corruption in the security forces&nbsp;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Lack of national political consensus&nbsp;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Drug-trafficking infiltration of state institutions&nbsp;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Human rights violations in military operations&nbsp;<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>US involvement<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>February 2025: designation of 6 cartels as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO)&nbsp;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Southern Spear naval operations&nbsp;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Intelligence sharing and joint operations&nbsp;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Threats of tariffs and diplomatic pressure&nbsp;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Deployment of troops at the southern border<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>1.3 ECUADOR \u2013 SECURITY COLLAPSE<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Evolution of the crisis<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Ecuador represents the most dramatic case of rapid regional security deterioration, transforming from an \u201cisland of peace\u201d into the country with the highest homicide rate in Latin America.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Data for 2025:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Murder rate: 47-50 per 100,000 inhabitants (projection: 9,100 deaths)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>40% increase compared to 2024<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>640% increase in homicides of minors since 2019<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Over 80,000 internally displaced persons (January-October 2024)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>90% of crimes go unpunished<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Criminal actors<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Main groups<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ol class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Los Choneros (weakened after the arrest of \u201cFito\u201d in July 2025)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Los Lobos (in expansion)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Los Tiguerones (fragmented into 5+ factions after their leader's arrest)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Los Chone Killers (split)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Los R, Los \u00c1guilas, Los Fatales (minor factions)<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Operational characteristics<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Operational base: penitentiary system<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Territorial control: coastal provinces (Guayas, Esmeraldas, Manab\u00ed, El Oro)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Alliances with Mexican cartels (Sinaloa, CJNG) and Colombian FARC dissidents<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Narco-governance: neighbourhood control, door-to-door extortion, \u201csocial\u201d services<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Violence and massacres<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Significant events in 2025<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>March 7: Guayaquil Massacre (22 dead, 120 families displaced) \u2013 Los F\u00e9nix vs Los Igualitos war<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>January: deadliest month since the official database was created (2010)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Electoral violence: over 140 incidents against political figures (the most violent electoral process since 2018)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Killings of officials: traffic officers, prison directors, magistrates (1\/3 of incidents)<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Arms trafficking<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Dramatic increase since 2021:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>2021: 1,299 cartridges and 155 magazines seized<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>2024: 84,164 cartridges, 996 magazines, over 1,500 firearms in 22 days<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Origin: Chile (via Peru), Colombia (northern border)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Concentration: the prison system<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Territorial control and narco-governance<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Port of Guayaquil: strategic hub for cocaine exports to the USA\/Europe<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Dur\u00e1n: among the world capitals of homicides<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Illegal gold mining (controlled by Los Lobos)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Systematic urban extortion rackets<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Neighborhoods divided by invisible boundaries between rival gangs<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Governmental response by Noboa<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Declaration of internal armed conflict: January 9, 2024<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Designation of 22 groups as terrorist organizations<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>The militarization of public security<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Consecutive states of emergency (9 in total)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Construction of mega-prisons (El Salvador model)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Extradition of key leaders (Fito to USA, July 2025)<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Critical issues<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Human rights violations: forced disappearances (33 cases in 2024-2025), torture<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>73,000 arrests in 2024; majority released due to lack of evidence<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Emblematic case: 4 teenagers kidnapped, tortured and burned by the army (December 2024)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>November 2025 referendum: Noboa\u2019s constitutional proposal rejected (political defeat)<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>NIAC classification<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">ACLED criteria for qualifying gang violence as a political conflict<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ol class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>\u2713 Public safety demonstrably at risk<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>\u2713 Criminal actors exercise de facto territorial control<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>\u2713 Frequent, organized, and publicly executed violence<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Status: Ecuador recognised as a domestic NIAC scenario since 2021 (ACLED benchmark)<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Implications<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Applicability of international humanitarian law<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Possibility of war crimes<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>State and non-state actors bound by IHL<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>1.4 OTHER CRITICAL COUNTRIES<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Colombia<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Persistent conflict with FARC dissidents, ELN, paramilitary groups<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Narco-governance in rural areas<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Cooperation with Ecuadorian gangs<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Brazil<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC): control of the S\u00e3o Paulo prison system<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Comando Vermelho (CV): Rio de Janeiro<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Rio operation, October 2024: 122 dead, highly controversial<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Anti-gang bill approved in November 2025: harsher penalties, no voting for prisoners<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Peru<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Security Minister Jer\u00ed: declaration of \u201cwar on crime\u201d (October 2025)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>States of emergency in Lima and Callao<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Increase in security forces attacks against civilians<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Haiti<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Almost total state collapse<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Gang Suppression Force: 80% increase in gang\u2013security force clashes (November)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Gang control in Tabarre, Croix-des-Bouquets, Kenscoff<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>2. HYBRID TERRORISM AND ASYMMETRIC THREATS<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>2.1 US FTO DESIGNATIONS<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">February 2025: U.S. State Department designates 6 Mexican cartels as Foreign Terrorist Organizations<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ol class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Sinaloa Cartel<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>CJNG<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Gulf Cartel<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Northeast Cartel<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>New Michoac\u00e1n Family<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>United Cartels<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Strategic implications<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Shift in rhetoric from \u201corganized crime\u201d to \u201cterrorism\u201d<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Potential US cross-border military operations<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Use of jus ad bellum to legitimize the use of force<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>November 2025: designation of the Cartel de los Soles (Venezuela)<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>2.2 Tren de Aragua (Venezuela)<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Rapidly expanding regional Venezuelan gang<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Exploitation of the Venezuelan mass migration<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Presence: Mexico, Colombia, Ecuador, Chile, Peru, USA<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Designated by the US as a terrorist organisation<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Capture of leader Nelson Arturo in Mexico (December 2025)<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>2.3 Hybrid tactics<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Elements of terrorism<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Attacks on critical infrastructure<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Use of IEDs and armed drones<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Systematic intimidation of the civilian population<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Targeted political assassinations<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Military-style assaults (Ecuador: seizure of a live TV studio, January 2024)<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Elements of organized crime<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Prevalent economic motivation<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Complex business structures<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Systematic corruption of institutions<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Diversification of the criminal portfolio<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>3. ASSESSMENT OF RISK LEVELS<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>3.1 SHORT-TERM RISK (6-12 MONTHS)<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>MEXICO: CRITICAL<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Indicators<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Escalation of militarization by cartels (FPV drones, heavy weapons)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Potential strategic alliance between CJNG and Los Chapitos<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>US pressure for cross-border interventions<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Increase in armed confrontations (Michoac\u00e1n +100%)<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Probable scenarios<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Intensification of the war within Sinaloa<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Territorial expansion of the CJNG<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Possible unilateral US military operations<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Increase in internal displacements<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Probability of materialization: 85%<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>ECUADOR: CRITICAL<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Indicators<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Projection 9,100 homicides in 2025 (+40%)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Fragmentation of criminal groups (unpredictable violence)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Political weakness of Noboa government after referendum<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>The prison system out of control<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Probable scenarios<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Further escalation of violence Q1 2026<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Multiple simultaneous massacres<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Partial collapse of state authorities in coastal provinces<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Possible intervention by foreign special forces<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Probability of materialization 80%<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>3.2 MEDIUM-TERM RISK (12-36 MONTHS)<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Regionalization of conflicts: high<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Main dynamics:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Operational expansion of Mexican cartels in Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Contagion of the Ecuadorian model to Peru and Colombia<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Increase in forced internal and cross-border migration<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Growing pressure on countries considered \u201cislands of stability\u201d (Uruguay, Chile, Costa Rica)<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Estimated probability: 70%<\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Multiple institutional collapse: medium-high<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Countries at risk:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Haiti (collapse already underway)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Venezuela (progressive erosion of state capabilities)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Nicaragua (authoritarian consolidation)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Honduras and Guatemala (growing structural fragility)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>El Salvador (post-Bukele uncertainty in the medium term)<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Estimated probability: 55%<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>3.2 MEDIUM-TERM RISK (12-36 MONTHS)<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Regionalization of conflicts: high<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Main dynamics:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Operational expansion of Mexican cartels in Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Contagion of the Ecuadorian model to Peru and Colombia<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Increase in forced internal and cross-border migration<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Growing pressure on countries considered \u201cislands of stability\u201d (Uruguay, Chile, Costa Rica)<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Estimated probability: 70%<\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Multiple institutional collapse: medium-high<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Countries at risk:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Haiti (collapse already underway)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Venezuela (progressive erosion of state capabilities)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Nicaragua (authoritarian consolidation)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Honduras and Guatemala (growing structural fragility)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>El Salvador (post-Bukele uncertainty in the medium term)<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Estimated probability: 55%<\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>4. ANALYSIS OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS (NIAC)<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>4.1 DEFINITION AND LEGAL CRITERIA<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">According to International Humanitarian Law, an NIAC (non-international armed conflict) is established when two fundamental criteria are met, also established by international jurisprudence (ICTY \u2013 Tadi\u0107 case):<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Intensity of armed violence<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Level of organization of the parties involved<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The following, by contrast, are not necessary requirements:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>The political motivation of the actors<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>The formal recognition of the conflict by the state<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Complete control of the territory<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>4.2 APPLICABILITY TO THE MEXICAN CASE<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Analyses by the Geneva Academy (RULAC) identify at least three NIACs in the Mexican context:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Government of Mexico vs Jalisco Nueva Generaci\u00f3n Cartel (CJNG)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Government of Mexico vs Sinaloa Cartel<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Conflict between the CJNG and factions of the Sinaloa Cartel<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Intensity of the conflict: met<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Key indicators:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>More than 450,000 violent deaths since 2006<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>More than 100,000 people missing<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Annual peak of over 33,000 homicides<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Systematic use of the armed forces in enforcement operations<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Conflict persisting for more than 15 years<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Qualitative elements:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Regular high-intensity armed clashes<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Widespread use of military weapons<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Territorial control by non-state actors<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Internal displacements of the civilian population<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Attacks on infrastructure and strategic targets<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Organisation of the parties: met<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">CJNG:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Centralized hierarchical structure<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Ability to command and control operations<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Planning of complex operations<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>International logistics and procurement of weapons<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Protected communication systems<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Intelligence and counter-intelligence activities<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Sinaloa Cartel:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Articulated but coordinated structure<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Multi-regional presence<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Consolidated operational capacity<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>International networks of criminal cooperation<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Infiltration into state institutions<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Common military capabilities:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Availability of military-grade weaponry<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Use of homemade armored vehicles<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Use of drones for surveillance and attack<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Checkpoint and territory control<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Taxation systems in controlled areas<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The economic motivation of the actors does not preclude their qualification as NIAC, since international humanitarian law considers exclusively the criteria of intensity and organization.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Implications:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Applicability of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Possible application of Additional Protocol II<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Responsibility for war crimes<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Potential jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (in the presence of specific conditions)<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The behavior of the Mexican state constitutes an implicit recognition of the conflict:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Systematic use of the armed forces<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Operations of a counterinsurgency nature<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Targeting of criminal leaders<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>International cooperation in the field of security<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>4.3 APPLICABILITY TO ECUADOR<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">NIAC status: CONFIRMED (2021\u2013present)<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">According to ACLED criteria, the conflict in Ecuador meets the conditions for classification as a non-international armed conflict.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Key indicators:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Public safety compromised on a national scale<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Presence of organized armed groups with territorial control<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Systemic violence, frequent and visible<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Intensity of the conflict: MET<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Murder rate: 47\u201350 per 100,000 inhabitants (2025)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>640% increase in juvenile homicides (2019\u20132024)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Multiple and simultaneous massacres<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>More than 80,000 internally displaced people<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Official declaration of \u201cinternal armed conflict\u201d (January 2024)<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Organisation of the parties: MET<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Main groups:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Los Choneros<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Los Lobos<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Los Tiguerones<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Organizational characteristics:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Defined hierarchical structures<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Urban territorial control<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Ability to perform coordinated operations<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Infiltration of the prison system<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Links with Mexican and Colombian cartels<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Transnational logistics of armaments<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Military-type operations:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Armed attack on a national television broadcaster (January 2024)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Simultaneous attacks in multiple cities<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Demonstrative public executions<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Control of urban areas and infrastructure<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Governmental recognition: EXPLICIT<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Declaration of \u201cinternal armed conflict\u201d (January 9, 2024)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Designation of 22 criminal groups as terrorist organizations<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Use of the armed forces in internal operations<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Introduction of states of emergency<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Activation of special tribunals<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>4.4 OTHER COUNTRIES \u2013 ASSESSMENT<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>BRAZIL: NIAC CONTESTED<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Arguments in favor of NIAC<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>PCC\/CV: military-grade organization<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Extensive territorial control of favelas<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Explosive drones used (November 2025)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Government military operations (Operation Rio)<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Arguments against NIAC<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>More localized intensity (not national)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Government denies existence of conflict<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Fragmentation of criminal actors (less unity)<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Assessment: CLOSE TO THE NIAC THRESHOLD in specific regions (Rio, S\u00e3o Paulo)<\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>HAITI: NIAC CONFIRMED<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Near-total collapse of state authority<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Gang control &gt;60% Port-au-Prince<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Persistent violence over many years<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Organized gangs (G9, GPep)<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>COLOMBIA: MULTIPLE ACTIVE NIACs<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Dissidents of the FARC<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>ELN<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Paramilitary groups<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Continued historical conflict<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>HONDURAS, GUATEMALA: PRE-NIAC<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Presence of MS-13, Barrio 18<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Not yet sufficient intensity<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Growing organization<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Risk of medium-term escalation<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>5. IMPLICATIONS OF NIAC QUALIFICATION<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Obligations of International Humanitarian Law<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">All parties to the conflict must:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Distinguish between combatants and civilians<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Protect the non-combatant population<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Prohibit torture and inhumane treatment<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Respect the wounded\/sick<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>No reprisals against civilians<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>No indiscriminate weapons<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Government<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Applying IHL standards beyond national criminal law<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>International liability for violations<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Obligation to investigate war crimes<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Possible ICC jurisdiction<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Non-state actors<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Bound by IHL even if they do not recognize it<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Individual criminal liability of leaders<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>War crimes: deliberate attacks on civilians, summary executions, torture<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Documented potential crimes<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Mexico<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Extrajudicial executions by security forces<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Forced disappearances<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Systematic torture by cartels<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Deliberate attacks on civilians (cartels)<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Ecuador<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Case of 4 incinerated teenagers (army) \u2013 possible wilful homicide<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Forced disappearances (33 cases) \u2013 possible war crime if systematic<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Torture of detainees<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Gang massacres of civilians<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Complex strategic situation<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Governments' dilemma<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Recognizing NIAC = legitimizing criminal actors as \u201cparties to the conflict\u201d<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Denying NIAC = avoiding international scrutiny but limiting legal instruments<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Designation of \u201cterrorism\u201d = political rhetoric but not an appropriate IHL framework<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>USA and FTO designation:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>It does not equal NIAC recognition (different classification)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Political-economic instrument (sanctions)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Potential authorisation of the use of force<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Possible bypass of LAC states' sovereignty<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>6. RECOMMENDATIONS AND OPERATIONAL PROPOSALS<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>6.1 IMMEDIATE STRATEGIC PRIORITIES<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Intelligence Collection (IC)<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>HUMINT<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Penetration of criminal networks through cooperating witnesses<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Network of informants in local communities (witness protection essential)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Cooperative intelligence sharing with LAC agencies (DEA, FBI, Europol coordinated)<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>SIGINT<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Intercepting encrypted communications of cartels<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Monitoring Telegram channels: malware, credential dumps, tactical coordination<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Dark web market surveillance (access brokers, RaaS)<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>OSINT<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Social media monitoring: TikTok, X, Facebook (recruitment, propaganda, ops coordination)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Web scraping local news from multiple sources (early warning massacres)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Flight tracking narco-aviation<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Satellite imagery of territorial control zones<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>CYBERINT<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Infiltration of cartels' IT infrastructure<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Tracking crypto wallets money laundering<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Malware reverse engineering attribution<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Cloud compromise monitoring<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Fusion Analysis<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Joint Intelligence Fusion Centers: Italy\u2013USA\u2013LAC partners<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Real-time threat assessment dashboards<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Predictive analytics machine learning (massacre forecasting)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Mapping of cross-border criminal networks (Social Network Analysis)<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>6.2 INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Multilateral frameworks<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>OEA\/OAS:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Strengthening the CICAD (Commission for Controlling Drug Abuse)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Rapid-response mechanism for regional security crises<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Standardization of anti-terrorism\/anti-gang legal frameworks<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>INTERPOL<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Enhanced Purple Notices fentanyl-related chemicals<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Real-time biometric database for transnational criminals<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Deployment of Mobile Command Units in critical countries<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>European Union<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Cocaine Route Programme expansion<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Capacity building of LAC security forces<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Border security technology transfer<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Bilateral cooperation<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>USA<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Merida Initiative 2.0 with greater enforcement<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Enhanced intelligence sharing (Five Eyes-style for LAC)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Training of Latin American special forces (counter-narcotics)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Technology transfer: drones, surveillance, cyber-defense<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Italy<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Exportable anti-mafia expertise (pentiti\/witness protection)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Carabinieri training programmes (already operational in some countries)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Italian magistrates advising on anti-mafia legislation<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Confiscation of criminal assets (expertise by the National Agency)<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>6.3 COUNTERING ORGANISED CRIME<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">High-Value Targets (HVT) strategy<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Decapitation of leadership<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Focus on the top 50 cartel leaders (Mexico)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Targeted capture\/elimination (in accordance with IHL)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Fast extraditions to the USA\/Europe<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>ICC prosecutions for war crimes (if NIAC is recognised)<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Risks<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Fragmentation of groups \u2192 increased unpredictable violence<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Power vacuum \u2192 rise of more violent factions (CJNG post-Milenio lesson)<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Mitigations<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Simultaneous targeting of multiple leadership tiers<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Asset seizure concurrent with decapitation<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Immediate post-arrest security forces presence in the area<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Kingpin Strategy vs Network Disruption<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Necessary shift<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>From \u201ckingpin strategy\u201d to \u201cnetwork disruption\u201d<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Targeting critical nodes, not only leaders: financial brokers, logistics coordinators, corrupt officials<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Dismantling value chains, not only leadership<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Operational focus<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Money laundering networks (cryptocurrencies tracking)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Precursor chemical supply chains (fentanyl)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Arms trafficking routes<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Corrupt officials who enable (the judiciary, the police, the military)<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Territorial control<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Mexico<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Permanent presence of security forces in contested zones (no raid-and-leave)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Community policing models (public trust)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Social infrastructure investment: schools, healthcare, employment (COIN principles)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>US border: border security technology (sensors, drones, AI monitoring)<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Ecuador<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Mega-prisons modeled after El Salvador (with safeguards for human rights)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Total control of the prison system (no gang governance)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Guayaquil ports recovery (joint military-customs operations)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Conflict neighbourhoods: permanent clearing operations<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>6.4 STABILISATION AND GOVERNANCE<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Rule of Law<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Judicial reform<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Judicial independence (protection from intimidation)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Specialized anti-organized crime courts<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Robust witness protection programs<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Anti-corruption prosecutors (Guatemala CICIG-style)<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Police reform<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Screening personnel (removal of corrupt officers)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Community policing doctrine<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Accountability mechanisms (body cameras, civilian oversight)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Competitive salaries vs corruption<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Socio-economic development<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Prevention upstream<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Youth employment programs targeted at high-risk areas<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Education investment in urban peripheries<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Alternative livelihoods for rural poppy\/coca growers<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Microfinance and entrepreneurship support<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Violence prevention<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Gang exit programs (the Honduras model \u201cYo Cambio\u201d)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Mental health services post-trauma<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Sports\/arts programs youth engagement<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Migration<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Root causes<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Addressing the drivers of emigration (violence, poverty)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Safe legal migration channels (no smuggling)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Refugee status for people fleeing violence (not just persecution)<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Regional cooperation<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Sharing the burden of accepting refugees<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Development assistance to transit countries<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Combat human trafficking networks<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>6.5 MONITORING AND EARLY WARNING<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Leading indicators<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Imminent escalation<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Sudden increase in social media violence posts<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Mass weapons purchases in specific regions<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Leadership arrests\/killings (vacuum power)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Spike in drug prices (supply disruption)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Political instability (elections, corruption scandals)<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Dashboard real-time<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Homicide rates updated daily<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Clash events mapping with GIS<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Tracking displaced populations<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Frequency of cyber attacks<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Activity of external actors (China\/Russia meetings, investments)<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Reporting Structure<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Reporting cadence<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>FLASH: critical events (immediate, &lt;2h)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Daily: situation over the previous 24h<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Weekly: trend analysis<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Monthly: strategic assessment<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Quarterly: forecast and recommendations update<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Dissemination<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Ministry of the Interior\/Foreign Affairs<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Intelligence services<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Law enforcement agencies<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Allied partners (NATO, EU, USA)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Restricted academic\/think tanks<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>7. CONCLUSIONS AND GENERAL ASSESSMENT<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>7.1 SITUATION SUMMARY<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Latin America is in a phase of multi-dimensional systemic crisis unprecedented in its recent history. The convergence of traditional (organised crime), asymmetric (cyber-warfare) and geopolitical (external penetration) threats generates a scenario of deep strategic instability with global implications.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>7.2 EVOLUTIONARY SCENARIOS 2026-2028<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>SCENARIO 1: UNCONTROLLED ESCALATION (Probability 35%)<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Characteristics<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Mexico\/Ecuador: transition from NIAC to partial failed states<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Regional contagion (5+ countries in NIAC by 2027)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Unilateral US military intervention in Mexico<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Massive migration crisis (10+ million displaced)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Economic collapse of key countries<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Direct Chinese\/Russian military presence (Venezuela, Nicaragua)<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Trigger<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Mass-casualty terrorist attack in the US attributed to a cartel<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Government collapse in Ecuador or Haiti<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Direct US-Mexico military conflict<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>SCENARIO 2: PARTIAL STABILIZATION (Probability 40%)<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Characteristics<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Containment of current levels of violence (no escalation)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Tactical successes against the cartels (decapitations, seizures)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>No new country in NIAC<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>External influence slowed down but not stopped<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Enhanced international cooperation<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Partial reforms of governance<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Trigger<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Effective political leadership in key countries<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Massive Western investments competing with China<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Technological breakthrough in law enforcement (AI, biometric tracking)<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>SCENARIO 3: STRATEGIC TRANSFORMATION (Probability 25%)<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Characteristics<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Significant de-escalation of violence (-30% by 2028)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Dismantling of major criminal networks<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Deep institutional reforms (judiciary, police)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Inclusive socio-economic development<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Reduction of coercive external influence<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Robust regional cooperation<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Trigger<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>LAC governments coalition + USA + EU long-term commitment<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Strategic drug legalization\/decriminalization (collapse of the black market)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Massive investment in development (in the Marshall Plan style)<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>7.3 ITALIAN NATIONAL INTEREST<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Direct threats<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Drug trafficking<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Italy is the European hub for South American cocaine<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Ports of Gioia Tauro and Genoa as infiltration targets<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>\u2018Ndrangheta: primary LAC\u2013Europe cocaine broker<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Cyber<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Italian companies targeted by Chinese APTs (tech and manufacturing sectors)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Critical infrastructure vulnerable to LAC-origin ransomware<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Migration<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Pressure from secondary LAC flows via Spain\/Balkans<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Engagement opportunities<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Exportable Expertise<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Anti-mafia model (DNA, pentiti, asset confiscation)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Carabinieri training (already operational in El Salvador and elsewhere)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Specialised magistrates providing legislative advice<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Economic interests<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Security exports (technology, training)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Post-conflict infrastructure (reconstruction)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Energy partnerships (Eni present in Venezuela and Mexico)<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>7.4 FINAL RECOMMENDATION<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Latin America represents the forgotten strategic front of global security. While international attention focuses on Ukraine, the Middle East, and Taiwan, the deterioration in the LAC region is proceeding with potentially catastrophic consequences for the Western order.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Imperative urgency<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ol class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>NIAC recognition: Mexico and Ecuador require application of IHL, not just law enforcement<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Massive investment: LAC Marshall Plan necessary to prevent multiple failed states<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Countering external penetration: China and Russia are winning the influence battle by Western default<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Intelligence cooperation: Permanent multinational fusion centers<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Comprehensive approach: Security + Development + Governance simultaneously, not sequentially<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Window of opportunity: 18-24 months before the worst-case scenarios consolidate<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Cost of inaction: permanent destabilisation of the continent, an epochal migration crisis, strategic geopolitical loss of the Western Hemisphere, nuclear narco-states (if external penetration advances).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">=======================================================================<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Primary sources:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>ACLED (Armed Conflict Location &amp; Event Data Project)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>RULAC (Rule of Law in Armed Conflicts) \u2013 Geneva Academy<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>InSight Crime<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Crisis Group<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>CrowdStrike Intelligence<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Check Point Research<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Fortinet Threat Intelligence<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Reports from agencies (DEA, FBI, Europol)<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Methodology:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Open Source Intelligence (OSINT)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Social Media Intelligence (SOCMINT)<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Cross-checking multiple sources<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Quantitative analysis of crime data<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>NIAC Framework according to IHL<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Risk assessment PESTLE modified<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Disclaimer: This report represents an assessment based on open source information updated as of December 2025. The dynamic nature of threats requires continuous monitoring and periodic updates.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\"\/>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">END OF REPORT<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Next update scheduled: March 2026<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Classification: archival document (open sources, December 2025)<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Dissemination: public (archive)<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Latin America can no longer be viewed merely as one of the world's principal theatres of drug trafficking.<br><br>\n\nAcross several parts of the region, the convergence of illicit economies, organised violence, and institutional weakness is progressively transforming criminal activity into a dynamic increasingly comparable to armed conflict.<br><br>\n\nMexico and Ecuador represent the most advanced examples of this evolution, with direct implications for both regional and international security.<\/p>","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[61],"tags":[152,149,92,145,159,174],"class_list":["post-3529","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-resilienza-sicurezza","tag-america-latina","tag-criminalita-organizzata","tag-governance-globale","tag-intelligence","tag-messico","tag-migrazioni"],"aioseo_notices":[],"aioseo_head":"\n\t\t<!-- All in One SEO 5.0.5.1 - aioseo.com -->\n\t<meta name=\"description\" content=\"Rapporto analitico riservato sulla criminalit\u00e0 organizzata e la capacit\u00e0 statale in America Latina, con focus su Messico ed Ecuador (dicembre 2025).\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"max-image-preview:large\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"author\" content=\"CSR Italia\"\/>\n\t<meta name=\"google-site-verification\" 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