Why the Security of Flows Has Become a Strategic Issue
When discussing energy, attention is often focused on producers, oil prices, or economic sanctions. Yet there is another fundamental dimension: the physical security of the routes through which energy and goods move across the global system.
When these routes become insecure, the system does not necessarily stop functioning, but it becomes slower, more expensive, and more vulnerable.
This second CSR Strategic Node examines the security of the world's principal strategic chokepoints and how tensions affecting these passages influence the broader global energy and trade system.
This vulnerability is not theoretical. In recent years, it has become increasingly visible along some of the world's most important maritime corridors.
The State of Strategic Chokepoints in June 2026: Security of Global Flows
Since 2022, and with a dramatic escalation since the beginning of 2026, the main chokepoints of global maritime trade — the Strait of Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb and the Red Sea — have become theatres of chronic instability.
This escalation coincides with the Iran–Israel–United States war: following the U.S.–Israeli attack of 28 February 2026 and the killing of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, Iran announced the closure of the Strait of Hormuz on 4 March. The passage became navigable again following the 8 April ceasefire, but tensions resurfaced in late June with a new exchange of attacks in the Strait.
Main manifestations:
• Drastic reduction in commercial traffic through the Strait of Hormuz due to direct threats and military tensions.
• Repeated and systematic attacks in the Red Sea that have made the route effectively unusable for many shipping companies.
• Forced rerouting of hundreds of vessels around the Cape of Good Hope, increasing navigation times by between 50% and 70%.
• Sharp increase in war-risk insurance premiums, which in some areas have reached levels 5–10 times higher than in the pre-2022 period.
• Numerous oil tankers blocked or forced to endure lengthy waiting times in the Persian Gulf.
Impact on Energy, Logistics, and Supply Chains
This situation has not, so far, resulted in a complete disruption of global flows. However, it has generated a significant and persistent increase in logistics costs, reduced supply chain predictability, and increased risk exposure for all actors involved.
For importing economies, the challenge extends beyond the possibility of supply interruptions. Rising insurance costs, longer shipping distances, and extended transit times are progressively transferred to final prices, affecting inflation, industrial competitiveness, and the stability of supply chains.
Even in the absence of a complete closure of key chokepoints, the compression of logistical efficiency can generate significant and long-lasting economic effects.
Updates as of 23 September 2026
Developments since the June 2026 cycle do not alter the nature of the risk already identified, but highlight a new dimension: pressure no longer affects only the main chokepoints, but is beginning to extend to some of the infrastructure and routes used by the system to compensate for their disruption.
Hormuz — persistence of disruption. Commercial traffic through the Strait remains severely depressed. As of 23 September, available data indicated that three commercial vessels had transited on the previous day, compared with a ten-day moving average of approximately 15; before the conflict, the Strait handled around 125 large commercial vessels per day. The data should be interpreted with caution, as some traffic may occur with AIS systems switched off, but it confirms the persistent nature of the disruption.
Bab el-Mandeb and the Red Sea — pressure on the second corridor. The Red Sea–Bab el-Mandeb system also remains exposed to increasing pressure. The advance of Houthi forces along the Yemeni coast has increased uncertainty over navigation security in a passage that is essential for connectivity between the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. Italy has consequently considered strengthening its naval presence in the area; approximately 40% of Italian trade passes through Suez.
Pressure on bypass capacity. The most structurally significant development concerns the vulnerability of alternatives to Hormuz. The Saudi East-West Pipeline, used to transfer approximately 4 million barrels per day to the Red Sea port of Yanbu while bypassing the Strait, was temporarily disrupted in September following a drone attack. Operations resumed on 22 September, initially at reduced capacity. At the same time, producers increased their use of flow reallocations and ship-to-ship transfers to keep exports operational.
Systemic interpretation of the update. The new element is therefore not simply an increase in tension around Hormuz. The system continues to display adaptive capacity and flows have not been disrupted as a whole; however, some of the infrastructure and routes that provide systemic redundancy have themselves come under pressure.
The configuration observed in September therefore indicates a reduction in adaptive redundancy: the capacity to compensate for the disruption of a chokepoint remains in place, but increasingly requires solutions that are more complex, costly and vulnerable to shock propagation.
As of 23 September 2026, these developments reinforce the criticality assessment of the Global Maritime Chokepoints Strategic Node, but do not, in isolation, warrant a new GSA cycle. Rather, they indicate increased pressure on the system’s compensatory capacity and require enhanced monitoring.
CSR evaluation
CSR's analysis identifies a configuration characterised by high systemic pressure, a strong capacity for risk transmission, and limited adaptive capacity within the international system.
The most significant risk is not merely the possibility of a sudden closure of major maritime passages, but the progressive erosion of operational efficiency and security, which increases operating costs, amplifies market volatility, and reduces the resilience of global supply chains.
In a system heavily dependent on maritime trade, chokepoint security is no longer merely a regional military issue, but a strategic variable capable of influencing prices, economic growth, and international stability.
Beyond individual incidents or regional crises, this Node highlights how the security of maritime flows has become a structural component of global economic stability.
This analysis is part of the dossier:
Global Energy Vulnerability: Two Dimensions of the Same Strategic Challenge
For further insight into the structural dimension of energy vulnerability,
See also:
“Global Energy Access Architecture: The New Stratification of the System”
and
the updated MST assessment of the Middle East macro-area.
Further Reading:
—> MST Framework Architecture
—> MST Special Nodes
Additional readings:
2026 Iran war — Wikipedia (EN)
2026 Iran war ceasefire — Wikipedia (EN)
2026 Iran war — Encyclopaedia Britannica
USA-Iran, from the attack of February 28 to the peace agreement — Sky TG24
US strikes Iran after Strait of Hormuz cargo ship attack — Fox News
Iran, Mojtaba Khamenei is the new Supreme Leader — Vatican News

