Sport as an Arena of Legitimization: FIFA, the Board of Peace, and the Contested Neutrality of Milano-Cortina

Sport as an Arena of Legitimization: FIFA, the Board of Peace, and the Contested Neutrality of Milano-Cortina

Sports Geopolitics has become an increasingly significant dimension of international relations. Major sporting events, international federations, and governing bodies are no longer merely platforms for athletic competition; they have also become instruments through which states pursue legitimacy, influence, and international recognition.

During the same period in which Gianni Infantino's FIFA has been strengthening its ties with Washington, Riyadh, and Rabat, the Olympic movement has been grappling for four years with a parallel challenge: how to deal with athletes representing a sanctioned state without excluding them entirely from international sport.

The two cases are institutionally unrelated—FIFA and the International Olympic Committee (IOC) operate under separate governance structures—but they raise the same underlying question: who determines what qualifies as "neutrality" in international sport, and in whose interest?

Through the MST Framework, CSR interprets these developments not as isolated episodes, but as manifestations of a broader competition for political and symbolic legitimacy within the international system.

Football in the Service of Power: The Infantino Case

Since succeeding Sepp Blatter as FIFA President in 2016, Gianni Infantino has built his leadership around a stated principle—that politics should remain outside football—a principle that has been repeatedly contradicted in practice.

The most controversial case remains the awarding of the 2022 FIFA World Cup to Qatar (a decision taken in 2010, prior to Infantino's presidency), amid persistent allegations of sportswashing linked to the deaths of more than 6,500 migrant workers employed between 2010 and 2021 in the construction of tournament infrastructure.

Infantino's speech on the eve of the tournament—in which he declared that he "felt Qatari, Arab, African, gay, disabled, and a migrant worker"—was criticised by Amnesty International as an attempt to minimise the human cost associated with the event.

Since then, the same model has not only persisted but expanded.
In December 2024, FIFA approved in a single vote both the awarding of the 2030 FIFA World Cup (Spain–Portugal–Morocco, with three opening matches in South America) and the 2034 FIFA World Cup (Saudi Arabia, the sole remaining bidder following Australia's withdrawal).

Twenty-one human rights organisations—including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch—described the decision in favour of Riyadh as "a moment of great danger" for human rights, while Infantino portrayed the tournament as a future "catalyst for social progress and reform."

The Washington Connection and the FIFA Peace Award

The relationship between Gianni Infantino and Donald Trump has assumed growing strategic importance in the management of the 2026 FIFA World Cup, jointly hosted by the United States, Mexico, and Canada.

In May 2025, Infantino arrived late at the FIFA Congress in Paraguay after accompanying President Trump on an official visit to Saudi Arabia and Qatar, prompting an unprecedented public protest from UEFA, which accused the FIFA President of placing "private political interests" ahead of football.

In December 2025, FIFA presented Donald Trump with the inaugural FIFA Peace Award, with Infantino praising the U.S. President for his "exceptional and extraordinary actions." FIFA has also established an office in Trump Tower, New York, further reinforcing the perception of an increasingly close institutional relationship.

This rapprochement produced tangible consequences during the tournament itself.
U.S. travel restrictions affecting several Muslim-majority countries—first introduced in 2017, when Infantino himself warned that such measures could jeopardise the hosting of a future World Cup—prevented Iranian supporters from entering the United States despite their national team's participation in the competition.

The same restrictions also prevented Somali referee Omar Artan from travelling to the tournament because of alleged links to terrorist organisations—an allegation that FIFA never publicly challenged, while continuing to honour his contractual remuneration throughout the competition.

Israel - Palestan Dossier

On the Middle East dossier, FIFA has adopted a position officially presented as one of neutrality and equidistance, yet increasingly challenged in practice.

In March 2026, the organisation decided not to sanction the Israel Football Association for allowing clubs to compete in settlements located in the occupied West Bank, describing the legal status of the territory as "an unresolved and highly complex issue." Rather than imposing disciplinary measures, FIFA called for dialogue and mediation between the Israeli and Palestinian football associations.
The Palestinian Football Association subsequently appealed the decision before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS).

During the same period, FIFA fined the Israel Football Association USD 185,000 for failing to address racist abuse by supporters of two domestic clubs.
At the same time, it entered into a "strategic partnership" with the Board of Peace, established by President Trump for the future administration of Gaza—an entity that does not include Palestinian representation.

The most visible manifestation of these tensions occurred during the FIFA Congress held in Vancouver in April 2026, when Infantino attempted to arrange a public handshake between Palestinian Football Association President Jibril Rajoub and Israel Football Association Vice-President Basim Sheikh Suliman.
Rajoub refused and left the stage.

According to figures reported by media outlets covering the conflict, the number of Palestinian casualties in Gaza exceeds 70,000, based on data released by local health authorities. These figures remain subject to independent verification, while the legal qualification of the events as genocide continues to be examined before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and does not, at present, constitute a definitive legal determination.

Milano-Cortina 2026: Neutrality as a Contested Concept

The Olympic movement has been confronting a different, yet structurally similar, challenge for the past four years: how to exclude an aggressor state without turning that exclusion into collective punishment for its athletes.

Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) excluded Russia and Belarus from the Olympic Games for violating the Olympic Truce.
At the Milano-Cortina Winter Games, which opened on 6 February 2026, neither country was represented by its flag, anthem, or national team. Instead, only thirteen athletes holding Russian passports were authorised to compete as Individual Neutral Athletes (AIN), exclusively in individual events, following a months-long eligibility review conducted by each international federation.

The eligibility criteria required athletes to demonstrate the absence of any links to the Russian armed forces or security services, as well as the absence of any public statements supporting the war.
Figure skater Petr Gumennik was required to change the music for his short programme shortly before departing for Italy because of a copyright dispute. Coverage of the incident on Russian state television was minimal, while only 15% of Russians surveyed said they intended to follow the Games—an indication of how the neutrality framework has eroded the propaganda value that Moscow has historically attached to international sport.

The Molfar Report and the Ukraine's Protest

The eligibility review process adopted by the IOC was criticised by Ukraine as insufficient.

Before the Games, the Molfar Intelligence Institute, a Ukrainian open-source intelligence research organisation, published a report alleging that 56 Russian winter sports athletes had verifiable links to the Russian war effort or to state structures supporting it. The report cited public statements, membership of military-affiliated clubs such as CSKA, participation in events organised by sanctioned entities, and family ties to state propaganda networks as supporting evidence.

Regarding the two figure skaters admitted as Individual Neutral Athletes (AIN), Adeliia Petrosian and Petr Gumennik, the report alleges, in the first case, that Petrosian wore clothing displaying the word "Russia" in 2022 and took part in a masterclass held in Moscow in 2024 as part of a festival associated with fundraising activities supporting the Russian war effort.
In Gumennik's case, the report points to family and social connections with public figures who have openly expressed support for the war.

On the basis of these findings, the National Olympic Committee of Ukraine, the Ministry of Youth and Sports of Ukraine, and the Ukrainian Figure Skating Federation formally requested that the IOC and the International Skating Union (ISU) review the eligibility of both athletes, arguing that their public activities were incompatible with the neutrality criteria established by the IOC itself for citizens of an aggressor state.

The central interpretative issue—what precisely constitutes "active support" for the war, as distinct from family connections or previous sporting affiliations—remains unresolved.
Moreover, the source documenting these allegations—an independent Ukrainian open-source intelligence institute that is nevertheless a party to the broader context of this conflict—should be considered alongside, rather than as a substitute for, the formal eligibility criteria applied by the international sports federations.

After the Games: ISU Readmission on 30 June 2026

The issue did not end with the closing ceremony of the Games.

On 30 June 2026—the day before the publication of this analysis—the International Skating Union (ISU) announced the readmission of Russian and Belarusian athletes to international skating competitions for the 2026–27 season. They will continue to compete under strict neutral status, with no flag, anthem, or national symbols, but with one significant development compared with Milano-Cortina: the possibility of forming a Neutral Team for team and relay events, from which they had previously been excluded.

The decision regarding the readmission of Russian and Belarusian judges and referees was postponed until the end of the forthcoming season. The ISU stated that its decision was based on the recommendations of the International Olympic Committee (IOC), which had previously authorised a limited number of Russian and Belarusian skaters to compete as neutral athletes at the Winter Games.

The timing—only a few months after the conclusion of the Games and following the unsuccessful Ukrainian challenge to the eligibility of the two individual athletes—suggests a broader trajectory of gradual reintegration that is progressing independently of the detailed assessment of the individual contested cases.

This follows a pattern already observed in other sports. The International Fencing Federation (FIE), led by Russian-Uzbek billionaire Alisher Usmanov, had already reinstated Russia and Belarus for team events in May 2025.

Two Arenas, One Systemic Logic

The two cases are not equivalent in form.

Under Infantino's leadership, FIFA has actively sought closer relations with centres of political and economic power—including the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Morocco—using international football as an instrument of diplomatic engagement.
The Olympic movement, by contrast, has been managing the gradual reintegration of athletes from a sanctioned state under intense political pressure, attempting to balance the principle of the universality of sport with the broader issue of collective responsibility arising from an ongoing war of aggression.

Yet the underlying systemic logic is the same in both cases.
International sports governance functions as an arena that attracts far less media attention than traditional diplomacy, while retaining considerable symbolic value. It is within this arena that states invest political capital in pursuit of legitimacy, normalisation, and international visibility at relatively low political cost.

In both cases, moreover, the concept of neutrality has itself become an object of political contestation rather than a purely technical category.
FIFA invokes neutrality to justify inaction on its most sensitive dossiers—including the occupied West Bank and the rights of migrant workers—whereas the IOC and the international sports federations employ it as a legal framework for assessing, on a case-by-case basis, the return of athletes associated with a sanctioned state.

In both contexts, those challenging the organisations' declared neutrality—the Palestinian Football Association on one side and the National Olympic Committee of Ukraine on the other—are required to demonstrate the existence of political links that the governing bodies themselves have a structural interest in avoiding recognition of.

What to Watch

Several developments will help determine whether the trends identified in this analysis continue to strengthen or begin to reverse.

These include the outcome of the Palestinian Football Association's appeal before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) concerning FIFA's decision not to sanction the Israel Football Association; the evolution of the Molfar report, which its authors describe as the first in a planned series covering other winter sports; the level of human rights scrutiny accompanying preparations for the 2034 FIFA World Cup in Saudi Arabia; and the pace at which other international sports federations follow the ISU in readmitting Russian and Belarusian athletes to team competitions, thereby progressively narrowing the distinction between individual neutrality and de facto normalisation.

CSR Strategic Assessment

CSR Strategic Assessment

No public statement by Gianni Infantino explicitly clarifies his objectives. What follows is an interpretation of the behavioural pattern observable in his public actions, not an admission by the individual concerned, and should therefore be understood as an analytical assessment rather than an established fact.

A first dimension concerns institutional continuity.
FIFA's Statutes limit the presidency to twelve years. However, the FIFA Council ruled that Infantino's initial partial term (2016–2019), following Sepp Blatter's resignation, would not count towards that limit—a reinterpretation that effectively allows him to remain in office until 2031. Infantino has already confirmed his intention to seek re-election at the 2027 FIFA Congress in Rabat, with publicly declared support from CONMEBOL, CAF, and the AFC. Maintaining strong relations with the heads of state of host countries and with the confederation blocs supporting his leadership is therefore consistent with this broader architecture of power.

A second dimension is commercial.
Infantino has pledged that FIFA's 2027–2030 commercial cycle will generate more than USD 14 billion in revenue, with USD 2.7 billion allocated to the Forward 4.0 development programme. The U.S. market (the 2026 FIFA World Cup and the 2025 FIFA Club World Cup, already hosted in the United States with President Trump attending the final) and Gulf investment (including sponsorship linked to Saudi Arabia's Public Investment Fund and the 2034 FIFA World Cup) represent the two principal drivers for achieving those objectives. Maintaining close relations with those controlling access to these markets is therefore consistent with FIFA's own publicly stated financial strategy.

A third dimension concerns a documented style of leadership that extends beyond tactical engagement with Donald Trump.
An investigation conducted by Play the Game found that, in Infantino's publicly available photographs with political leaders, leaders displaying authoritarian tendencies appear almost three times more frequently than democratic leaders. His proximity to personalised political power therefore predates—and extends well beyond—the Trump relationship.

With regard to Trump specifically, two practical considerations appear particularly relevant.

The first concerns operational risk management.
As President of the United States, Trump directly controls several of the policy instruments capable of affecting the successful organisation of a FIFA World Cup hosted on U.S. territory—including visas, border access, security arrangements, and the entry of teams and officials—as illustrated by the cases involving Somali referee Omar Artan and Iranian supporters. Maintaining a constructive relationship with the U.S. Administration therefore reduces a significant operational risk for FIFA.

The second concerns symbolic exchange at relatively low political cost.
Trump has consistently demonstrated a strong appreciation for public recognition—including his well-known aspiration to receive the Nobel Peace Prize. Conferring a FIFA Peace Award imposes virtually no cost on Infantino while helping to cultivate a political relationship that protects the tournament and, indirectly, reinforces his own prospects for re-election.

In summary, Infantino's declared objective is to keep politics out of football. The observable pattern of his decisions, however, points in the opposite direction: the systematic use of relationships with political power—whether democratic or authoritarian—as a means of consolidating his leadership of FIFA while advancing the organisation's strategic and commercial objectives.

Sources

Daniel Tester, "How Gianni Infantino Brought Middle East Politics to the World Cup", Middle East Eye

"At Milan Cortina Winter Olympics, Russian Athletes Are a Diminished Presence", The Moscow Times, 12 February 2026

"Is Russia Participating in the Olympics?", Encyclopaedia Britannica

Korbinian Leo Kramer, "Olympics at War's Edge: Russian Athletes, Neutral Flags Ahead of Milano-Cortina 2026", Kyiv Post, 2 January 2026

"ISU Reinstates Russian and Belarusian Figure Skaters as Neutral Athletes", The Moscow Times, 30 June 2026

"Infantino's FIFA: Ten Years of Power, Politics and So-Called Ethics", Play the Game

"Four More Years. Infantino Confirms He Wants to Keep the FIFA Presidency", Inside World Football, 1 May 2026

"Infantino May Lead FIFA Until 2031 as Council Says First 39 Months Did Not Count", Inside the Games

Editorial Note:
Some elements relating to the Israel–Palestine dossier and the Molfar report are drawn from sources that openly represent one side of the respective conflicts (Middle East Eye; the Ukrainian Molfar Intelligence Institute). Wherever possible, these materials have been cross-checked against primary sources—including statements issued by FIFA, the IOC and the ISU—and are presented by clearly distinguishing verifiable facts from the assessments advanced by the parties involved.

Further Reading:

Global Strategic Analysis