Technology and Energy as Power Infrastructure: the Taiwan–Bolivia Axis

Technology and Energy as Power Infrastructure: the Taiwan–Bolivia Axis

When strategic competition no longer concerns territories, but systems – Technology and Energy

In the current geopolitical environment, technology and energy are no longer separate domains of economic or industrial policy. They have become core infrastructures of strategic power, through which dependencies are created, margins of sovereignty are defined, and political choices are constrained.

The apparent distance between Taiwan and Bolivia makes this transformation particularly visible. In both cases, control over critical assets—advanced semiconductors in the former, strategic energy and mineral resources in the latter—translates into forms of systemic influence that are not necessarily expressed through direct coercion.

From energy security to technological security

For decades, energy security constituted the backbone of power strategies: access to resources, control of routes, and supplier stability. Today, a new priority has emerged alongside it: technological security.

Semiconductors, digital networks, computing infrastructure, and advanced energy systems form an integrated ecosystem. Control over any single node is insufficient; what matters is the capacity to govern their integration across global value chains.

Taiwan occupies a pivotal position within this system. Not for symbolic or territorial reasons, but because it represents a concentration point that remains difficult to substitute within the global technological architecture.

Bolivia and the control of critical raw materials

Bolivia, in a less visible but no less significant way, occupies a similar strategic position on the energy and mineral resources front. Lithium, gas, and other raw materials essential for the energy transition are transforming the country into a critical node for the evolution of global technological systems. However, the domestic political landscape has changed substantially compared to what has been described so far: on November 8, 2025, the new president Rodrigo Paz took office, ending twenty years of rule by the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) and setting in motion a new law on lithium aimed at attracting foreign capital and partnerships while maintaining the agreements already signed by the previous government with China and Russia. On April 28, 2026, Bolivia and the United States signed a memorandum of understanding on critical minerals, and in the following weeks La Paz sought to expand technological cooperation with Brazil and Germany as well. The competition, therefore, no longer manifests itself solely through selective investment and technology transfer models by external actors: it also manifests itself through an active repositioning of the Bolivian government, which uses its lithium reserves as a negotiating leverage with several partners simultaneously, including the USA. Formal sovereignty remains intact; substantive sovereignty remains constrained by dependence on foreign investments for the development of the supply chain, but the picture of dependencies is now more nuanced and less unequivocally oriented towards China and Russia than the original article implied.

Interdependence as a power instrument

What links Taiwan and Bolivia is neither development level nor political alignment, but their location within highly asymmetric interdependence chains. In such contexts, interdependence does not mitigate conflict; it restructures it.

Access to critical technologies or indispensable resources becomes a permanent negotiating lever. Power is exercised less through exclusion than through the selective management of access, timing, and conditions of integration into global systems.

Systemic implications for global governance

The rising centrality of technology and energy redraws the boundary between economy, security, and foreign policy. Industrial choices become strategic decisions; technical standards acquire geopolitical significance.

Within this framework, the principal risk is not sudden supply disruption, but progressive politicisation. Global governance shifts from a rules-based model toward one grounded in the management of critical dependencies.

Core Thesis

Taiwan and Bolivia represent two ends of the same phenomenon: the transformation of technology and energy into power infrastructures. They are not regional exceptions, but indicators of a systemic trend in which strategic competition increasingly revolves around controlling nodes, standards, and critical resources.

The central question is not whether such interdependencies can be eliminated, but who will define their operational rules. In a fragmented international system, governing critical infrastructures becomes the primary modality of power.

Update (July 2026): The change of government in Bolivia and the agreement with the United States on critical minerals show that, at least in the case of Bolivia, the asymmetry described in this article is not devoid of room for maneuver for the node state: a change in political leadership can quickly translate into a repositioning among several external partners. It remains to be seen whether this margin translates into a real strengthening of Bolivian substantive sovereignty or into a diversification of the same form of dependence described in the article.

Further reading: the updated MST assessment of the macro-area. Latin America.

CSR Note

This analysis draws on validated open-source material and a structural reading of geopolitical and industrial dynamics. It does not imply value judgments regarding national policies or the intentions of individual actors.

Additional readings:

Elettronica News — Rare Earths: China-USA, partial truce (November 2026)

Ingenio — China blocks rare earths, new tightening on exports and technologies

Bologna Press — EU proposes new sanctions against Russia: oil, shadow fleet, crypto, fishing

ANSA — The Royal Marines stop a Russian shadow fleet oil tanker (June 2026)

L’Opinione — Russian shadow oil tanker stopped off the coast of Sicily (June 2026)

Linkiesta — Germany says no to Palantir (May 2026)

Startmag — How Germany snubs Palantir and opts for ChapsVision

Euronews — Why European governments are reviewing their contracts with Palantir (June 2026)

Morning Tech — France replaces Palantir with French software

Sky TG24 — Bolivia, Rodrigo Paz wins the runoff election (Oct. 2025)

AGI — Who is Rodrigo Paz, the new president of Bolivia

CNN Español — USA announces agreement with Bolivia on critical minerals (April 2026)Infobae — Bolivia seeks to expand technological cooperation with the US (May 2026)