Energy, Debt and Systemic Leverage in the Redesign of the Global Order
Executive Summary
This document analyzes a possible strategic trajectory attributable to the Trump administration through a multidomain reading consistent with the CSR framework and methodologically compatible with the Global System Assessment (GSA) of 30 March 2026.
The working hypothesis is that the United States is attempting to transform certain structural vulnerabilities — high debt, the erosion of multilateral hegemony, and relative industrial fragilities — into instruments of systemic pressure based on the convergence of dollar centrality, energy advantage, and geopolitical control of strategic corridors.
In this sense, Fortress America should not be read merely as a posture of retrenchment or defensive isolation, nor as a fully linear, unified, and already completed strategic design. More realistically, it appears as a set of heterogeneous initiatives — energy, financial, security-related, and territorial — that Washington is trying to convert into a capacity for asymmetric pressure.
The decisive point is not to determine whether a perfectly coherent plan exists, but rather to assess whether these moves — often transactional, reactive, or opportunistic — are producing a sufficiently convergent effect to generate selective dependencies before exposed actors complete their own exit routes. The central issue, therefore, is not the original unity of the design, but its systemic effectiveness.
The real strategic question is whether this multidomain leverage can produce systemic conditioning before exposed actors complete their escape routes: energy diversification, alternative payment systems, the regionalization of clearing chains, and reduced exposure to the dollar.
In line with the GSA of 30 March 2026, this document does not certify the emergence of an already completed global systemic rupture, but identifies a trajectory capable of increasing multidomain pressure and hardening the configuration of advanced systemic friction already observed in the reference cycle.
1. Observed pattern
The observed pattern does not describe merely a sequence of crises, but rather a possible reconfiguration of the international order around three converging levers:
— energy
— debt
— territory
The hypothesized trajectory suggests a partial reversal of the traditional paradigm of American power. Rather than projecting stabilization outward through multilateral frameworks, Washington appears to be moving toward the construction of selective dependencies, turning its financial and energy centrality into an instrument of structural pressure.
This dynamic, however, should not be interpreted as the necessary expression of a fully unified and preordained design. More cautiously, it may be read as an attempt to render coherent, ex post or in the course of events, a plurality of often heterogeneous initiatives developed in response to crises, opportunities, or contingent constraints.
The underlying operational logic may be summarized as follows: actors most exposed to U.S. debt and to the dollar have limited room for disengagement; if this dependency is combined with a strengthening of U.S. energy leverage, American conditioning power may increase significantly in the short to medium term.
This remains, however, a dynamic of systemic compression, not an irreversible automatism nor proof of a newly consolidated order. In terms compatible with the GSA, the trajectory analyzed here should be read as a multidomain hardening factor within a system that, as of 30 March 2026, was already in a condition of advanced systemic friction, but still lacked full global synchronization of pressures.
2. Dominio Analysis
2.1 Energy — Score: 4.6 / 5.0
Classification: Advanced critical convergence, with growing internal frictions
The energy domain constitutes the strongest core of the trajectory under analysis. The United States combines:
— an already dominant position in domestic production;
— growing LNG export capacity;
— geopolitical pressure on areas and reserves of high strategic relevance;
— the ability to influence, directly or indirectly, the security of global energy corridors.
The central element is not a full energy monopoly, but the possibility of exercising asymmetric conditioning power over supply and route security, especially toward actors highly dependent on imports. This advantage, however, generates rising internal costs.
LNG exports, which grew by 26% in 2025 and reached historic highs, contributed to a significant increase in domestic natural gas prices: American households paid on average 181 dollars more on their utility bills over the course of the year (+21% according to analyses based on EIA data), for an estimated overall burden of roughly 16 billion dollars.
The growing exposure to global markets also makes the U.S. energy system more sensitive to external shocks, such as those observed during the Strait of Hormuz crisis between March and April 2026, which temporarily pushed gasoline prices above 4 dollars per gallon in several areas.
In this sense, the U.S. energy advantage is real, but it generates clear trade-offs between external leverage and the stability of domestic prices.
In this framework, Hormuz represents more a lever of strategic deterrence than a sustainable closure option without blowback costs.
In GSA terms, this domain is consistent with the increase in pressure already observed along the Middle East – European Union – energy chokepoints axis, and it contributes to increasing the system’s sensitivity to the simultaneous propagation of regional shocks.
2.2 Finance — Score: 4.4 / 5.0
Classification: Critical convergence
The relationship between U.S. debt, the dollar, and the dependency of major creditors constitutes the second pillar of the analysis.
Actors such as Japan, China, India, and Europe hold exposures that make any abrupt disengagement from Treasuries extremely costly. The centrality of the dollar therefore continues to function as a binding mechanism. If this financial dependence combines with renewed energy pressure, U.S. leverage takes on a dual nature: monetary and energy-based.
However, the trap is not absolute. Although foreign holdings of Treasuries reached new records (9.49 trillion as of February 2026), an ongoing structural diversification is also visible: China has continued reducing its exposure (down to 693 billion), while the accumulation of gold and other alternative reserves is increasing. The aggressive use of leverage therefore risks accelerating precisely those processes of partial de-dollarization that Washington seeks to slow down.
From this perspective, the centrality of the dollar and the enduring demand for Treasuries should not be read only as expressions of residual systemic strength, but also as a necessary condition for managing over time a real devaluation of U.S. public debt without surrendering control of the global monetary architecture.
The strategic point is not simply to reduce the weight of the debt, but to do so without allowing that reduction to translate into a loss of dollar centrality or into an acceleration of alternative circuits.
If this requirement combines with renewed energy leverage and with the ability to maintain selective external dependencies, part of the adjustment costs can be transferred beyond the U.S. perimeter.
In this sense, the Fortress America trajectory can also be read as an attempt to transform an internal structural vulnerability — debt — into a lever of external systemic recompression.
This domain does not contradict the role of the United States as a resilient global systemic pivot in the GSA, but it suggests that this function may, in the cycle under consideration, also be exercised through selective forms of pressure that increase the vulnerability of other actors.
2.3 Security — Score: 4.5 / 5.0
Classification: Critical convergence
The security domain shows a growing fusion between the conflict in the Gulf, pressure on the Western Hemisphere, and the containment of rival penetrations in areas of high strategic importance.
The pressure on Canada and Greenland can be read as an extension of a logic of control of the Western Hemisphere, while Venezuela at the same time represents a resource, a regional lever, and a space of interdiction against Chinese penetration into Latin America.
Operations such as the one conducted in January 2026 (the capture of Maduro and the maintenance of a naval presence/blockade) nonetheless entail high operational costs — hundreds of millions of dollars already in the first months — and increase the risk of overstretch, reducing room for manoeuvre in other sensitive theatres such as the Gulf or the containment of China.
Here again, a methodological clarification is necessary: the security domain contributes to the rigidification of the system, but it is not sufficient in itself to determine a reclassification of the overall picture in the absence of simultaneous synchronization between multiple critical macro-areas.
2.4 Regulatory — Score: 3.9 / 5.0
Classification: Systemic Friction in transition towards Critical Convergence
At the normative level, the described trajectory signals the increasing subordination of multilateral rules to the logic of strategic expediency. Treaties, trade frameworks, and international law appear to be progressively repositioned within a bilateral or selective logic, in which the validity of agreements depends on their usefulness for the dominant power.
The point is not the abolition of the regulatory order, but its increasing instrumentalization.
This reading is consistent with the GSA, which on 30 March reported a normative-regulatory domain that was still operational but more exposed to friction, with shrinking cooperative space.
2.5 Cognitive — Score: 3.7 / 5.0
Classification: Systemic friction
The narrative of self-sufficiency and national re-centering is internally effective and helps to present the strategy as necessary, rational, and defensive. Externally, however, it produces disorientation and fragmentation of responses.
Europe in particular appears to lack a coherent systemic counter-narrative. This makes the cognitive domain an essential accompanying variable: it does not drive the process alone, but facilitates its political sustainability.
The cognitive domain is thus confirmed, in GSA terms, as a transversal multiplier of pressure, especially when combined with energy, financial and decision-making vulnerabilities.
2.6 Technology — Score: 3.4 / 5.0
Classification: Systemic friction
The technological domain acts as a material multiplier of the energy strategy, especially through LNG infrastructure, logistics, export capacity, and related value chains.
On the opposite side, China’s efforts in renewable energy, nuclear power, and alternative payment systems indicate a response in the making, but with maturation times that are incompatible with rapid rebalancing.
In the GSA framework, this domain remains relevant especially as a factor of future structural compression, rather than as a vector of immediate rupture.
3. Reading the picture in GSA terms
The present analysis does not constitute a GSA in the strict sense, which derives from the integration of the macro-areas validated in the reference cycle. It is rather a multi-domain reading consistent with the GSA logic, useful for estimating how far the trajectory Fortress America could contribute to increasing global systemic pressure.
The GSA of March 30, 2026 placed the international system in a phase of:
— Advanced Systemic Friction
— Configuration: non-synchronised asymmetric compression
— GSA Index: 3.8 / 5
With derived global metrics equal to:
— Global average DS: about 4.1
— Global average ICA: about 3.6
— Global average DN: about 4.15
In this context, the trajectory analysed here does not change the GSA classification, but explores one of its possible axes of hardening.
3.1 Domains – variation compatible with the GSA baseline
| Domain | Baseline | Current score | Delta |
| Energy | 4.1 | 4.6 | +0.5 |
| Security | 3.9 | 4.5 | +0.6 |
| Finance | 3.8 | 4.4 | +0.6 |
| Normative–regulatory | 3.6 | 3.9 | +0.3 |
| Cognitive | 3.5 | 3.7 | +0.2 |
| Technology | 3.2 | 3.4 | +0.2 |
Overall, the trajectory analyzed appears compatible with an increase in multidomain pressure and with a possible migration towards a higher threshold of Critical Convergence. However, it does not, on its own, justify redefining the picture of the 30 March 2026 GSA, which remains classified as advanced Systemic Friction in a configuration of non-synchronised asymmetric compression.
The central point is therefore not the emergence of an already consolidated global systemic rupture, but the increase of a multi-domain pressure that can accelerate the system's transition towards higher convergence, if the adaptive capacity of the pivots is further reduced and energy, financial and security shocks become synchronised.
3.2 Consistency with the United States macro-area
Compared to the MST baseline of the United States macro-area, the interpretative framework of Fortress America is substantially consistent and introduces no elements of contradiction with the already validated mechanical structure.
The US macro-area, in the baseline of March 30, 2026, is in fact configured as a system under high multi-domain pressure, but still equipped with sufficient adaptive capacity to prevent, at present, a transition towards higher forms of internal convergence.
In this context, the United States does not emerge as an area in collapse or systemic rupture, but rather as a resilient systemic pivot under stress, capable of absorbing and above all redistributing pressure within the system.
It is precisely at this point that Fortress America fits: not as an attempt to reclassify the macro-area, but as a thematic exploration of its systemic function.
The document outlines a possible dynamic through which the United States, in the presence of relative vulnerabilities in the areas of debt, industrial competition, and the maintenance of the multilateral order, seeks to transform such vulnerabilities into external capacity for conditioning.
The main levers identified are energy, finance, security and control of strategic corridors.
In this perspective, Fortress America does not change the MST classification of the US macro-area, but makes the systemic behavior more readable: the United States does not overcome the pressure by collapsing under it, but by trying to modulate it and transfer it externally selectively.
Summary formula: Fortress America does not automatically raise the United States' score; it clarifies its systemic function within the framework of advanced friction already identified by the GSA.
4. Scenarios
Scenario A — Consolidated fortress
Probability: 20%
The United States manages to consolidate a dominant position in the energy domain and to convert its financial advantage into the systemic disciplining of the main dependent actors. The effect would be a strong external recession, especially in Asia and Europe, but with blowback costs for Washington too.
This scenario would imply a significant deterioration in the compensatory function of other actors, but it cannot be considered the most likely path today.
Scenario B — Controlled fragmentation
Probability: 40%
A progressive bifurcation is emerging between the US dollar/energy area and attempts to build alternative circuits in the Eurasian area. The tension remains high but does not degenerate into collapse.
This appears to be the most plausible scenario for the 2026–2028 biennium and is the one that is most consistent with the GSA: high pressure, increasing node density, but no complete systemic synchronization.
Update (July 2026): The actual outcome came closer to Scenario B (Controlled Fragmentation) rather than Scenario C. The US-Israel-Iran conflict ended on June 14, 2026 with a memorandum of understanding after 107 days, preceded by a ceasefire (April 7-8) and a naval blockade on Hormuz (April 11-13) that did not degenerate into systemic collapse. On the Venezuelan front, the Rodriguez government (successor to Maduro after the capture on January 3, 2026) continued the normalization of relations with Washington, including agreements on the supply of Venezuelan oil (50 million barrels, with sales of over $1 billion in the first months and projections for further $5 billion). This outcome is consistent with the ‘asymmetric overextension’ reading already indicated in section 5.1 as a structural vulnerability in the American trajectory, but did not produce the collapse assumed in Scenario C.
5. Structural vulnerabilities of the American trajectory
The identified trajectory is internally consistent, but it presents at least four vulnerabilities.
5.1 Asymmetric overextension
The attempt to simultaneously manage Venezuela, Canada, Greenland, the Gulf and contain China requires a multi-level projection capability that could exceed American sustainability in the medium term.
The risk does not only concern the geographical dispersion. It also concerns the heterogeneous nature of the theaters involved: each requires different instruments, different timeframes, and different forms of political legitimacy. The overall effect may be one of an ostensibly expansive stance but actually exposed to strong internal trade-offs between energy priorities, military deterrence, financial stability, and domestic consensus.
In this perspective, overstretch should not be understood as a simple quantitative excess of commitments, but as a possible qualitative imbalance between strategic ambition and the effective ability to sustain over time the costs, timelines, and frictions of simultaneous pressure across multiple quadrants.
5.2 Hormuz Paradox
The threat over Hormuz is effective primarily as a deterrent. Its actual implementation would cause an energy and financial shock that would also affect the United States.
5.3 Acceleration of exit routes from the dollar
Excessive use of leverage can accelerate the search for alternatives: parallel payment systems, bilateral agreements, regionalisation of clearing. This trajectory does not eliminate the dollar in the short term, but it can gradually erode its exclusivity.
Although foreign holdings of Treasuries remain very high, there are signs of structural diversification: some large players, starting with China, have gradually reduced their exposure, while attention to gold and alternative reserve instruments is growing.
5.4 Domestic costs and internal friction
The intensive use of energy, financial and military levers can generate increasing internal tensions. Strengthening external leverage is not necessarily compatible with internal economic and political stability: increased energy costs, pressures on consumers, increased market sensitivity, political polarization and opposition to the cost of external postures can erode the sustainability of the trajectory over time.
This element is crucial because it signals a possible structural limit of Fortress America: a strategy effective in producing pressure on other actors can, at the same time, increase the costs of holding together its own domestic system. If these costs exceed a politically or socially sensitive threshold, external leverage tends to turn into internal vulnerability.
6. Implications for Europe
Europe appears to be the most exposed and least prepared. European vulnerability is threefold:
— energy, due to dependence on imports and an incomplete transition;
— financial, due to the centrality of the dollar and its related assets;
— commercial, due to exposure to American markets and pressure.
The main structural responses — energy strengthening, strategic autonomy, integration of capital markets, reduction of technological dependence — remain below the speed required by events today.
The risk is not just economic. It is systemic: Europe could find itself undergoing a restructuring of its dependence without having completed any of the necessary transitions to reduce its exposure.
In terms consistent with the GSA, this strengthens the role of theEuropean Union as a regional compensatory pivot under pressure, with adaptive capacity still present but more exposed to the deterioration of the energy-financial picture.
Final verdict
Fortress America should be read not as an accomplished fact, but as a strategic hypothesis of re-centralising global leverage through energy, debt and control of corridors.
If even part of this trajectory were to consolidate, the international system would emerge more fragmented, less rule-bound and more vulnerable to induced systemic shocks.
The analytical point is not to certify a new order today, but to note that the multidomain pressure generated by this trajectory can contribute to accelerating the transition towards a more fragmented system, more exposed to shocks, without necessarily producing an alternative order that is fully consolidated in the short term.
The central point is therefore the emergence of a hardening systemic compression, not yet of an accomplished rupture.
In line with the GSA of March 30, 2026, the document does not contradict the classification of advanced Systemic Friction, but represents a compatible thematic exploration of it, strengthening the reading of a more compressed system, more sensitive to multi-domain propagation and more vulnerable to future critical synchronisations.
However, one crucial element remains: the American trajectory does not merely produce external effects. It also generates internal negative feedback, which can affect its own sustainability.
Precisely for this reason, Fortress America should be understood less as an already stabilised configuration and more as an attempt to exploit a window of relative advantage before domestic costs (energy and military), others' diversification and the frictions of overextension reduce its effectiveness.
As of 19 April 2026, signs of such negative feedback are already visible both in domestic energy prices and in the ongoing operations in Venezuela and the Gulf.
With hindsight, the outcome in the Gulf and Venezuela confirms the thesis of a managed systemic compression prolonged over time more than that of an accelerated collapse: the Controlled Fragmentation scenario proved to be the closest to the facts.
Methodological note on scenario probabilities
The percentages attributed to the different scenarios are not of a statistical, algorithmic or predictive nature in the strict mathematical sense and should not be read as quantitative forecasting.
They represent a comparative analytical assessment of structural plausibility, developed based on four main criteria:
1. Consistency with the observed structural data
Each scenario was evaluated in relation to the degree of compatibility with the dynamics already in place in the reference cycle: energy pressure, persistence of the US systemic advantage, European vulnerability, reactions of the main systemic actors, and the course of the main friction lines.
2. Compatibility with the GSA baseline
The probabilities were constructed consistently with the systemic assessment of the cycle considered. In particular, the 30 March 2026 GSA baseline describes a configuration of advanced Systemic Friction and non-synchronised asymmetric compression, in which pressure is high but not yet fully convergent on a global scale.
Consequently, scenarios involving hardening, fragmentation, and increased pressure are more plausible than those that presuppose a fully synchronized global systemic rupture already in place.
3. Operational sustainability of the hypothesized trajectories
Each scenario was also assigned a weight based on its actual sustainability over time: the actors’ ability to manage its costs, the likelihood of political durability, economic compatibility, and the ability of opponents or partners to react.
4. Presence or absence of simultaneous triggers
As of April 19, 2026, the partial activation of triggers in Latin America and the Middle East has reduced the margins for control of fragmentation, making the monitoring of possible accidental cascades more relevant.
The percentages indicated therefore express an analytical plausibility hierarchy among alternative scenarios, and not an objective or statistically measurable probability.
Their function is indicative and comparative: they are intended to show which trajectory appears more coherent with the systemic framework observed and which scenarios, although less likely, should remain actively monitored.
Internal links
CSR method
https://csr-italia.org/metodo-csr/
Dalio: the war we don't see
https://csr-italia.org/dalio-guerra-sistema-globale/
BlackRock does not save Trump
https://csr-italia.org/blackrock-non-salva-trump/
Sanctions as systemic coercion
https://csr-italia.org/sanzioni-come-coercizione-sistemica-energia-pagamenti-e-frammentazione-della-governance-globale/
Global System Assessment Report
https://csr-italia.org/global-system-assessment-report/

