State capacity-building, the disarmament of Hezbollah, and the limits of European power projection in the Levant
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With Resolution 2790 of August 2025, the Security Council extended UNIFIL for the last time: the mandate ends on 31 December 2026 and the withdrawal of contingents will be completed during 2027. The “post-UNIFIL” transition discussed in this analysis is no longer a prospect but a deadline only weeks away: the stability of the security arrangement in southern Lebanon will depend on the Lebanese Armed Forces’ ability to take over and on the external support, French and European, described below. The core of the analysis remains valid.
Executive Summary
- Thesis: the Lebanese dossier is a test case for France’s strategic reconversion: less direct projection, more state capacity-building and multilateral frameworks to manage instability.
- Critical node: the “post-UNIFIL” horizon is not a technical adjustment: it shifts security from an international buffer to the state’s internal coercive monopoly — politically explosive terrain in Lebanon.
- Structural limit: Europe’s posture remains subordinated to regional dynamics (US–Iran–Israel) and to Lebanon’s internal legitimacy; the risk is to administer instability without being able to build order.
The Lebanese dossier is one of the main test cases for France’s ability to restructure its influence in a fragmented regional environment marked by the crisis of traditional multilateral architectures. Paris’s positions on Hezbollah’s disarmament, strengthening the Lebanese Armed Forces, and the post-UNIFIL horizon should be read as part of a broader attempt to redefine France’s role in the Levant.
Less direct intervention, more capacity-building; less military presence, more multilateral frameworks; less control, more management of instability.
Paris’s logic: the state, monopoly of arms, and capacity-building
Within the French posture, stabilising Lebanon is framed as a problem of coercive sovereignty: rebuilding a “strong and sovereign” state capable of holding the legitimate monopoly on force. In this frame, strengthening the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) becomes the operational prerequisite for any trajectory of recomposition of the armed field — including, over time, a progressive reduction of Hezbollah’s military space — and the backbone of a future national security architecture.
The Paris conference in support of the Lebanese army fits this logic not as a decision-making platform, but as an instrument of political, financial, and symbolic coordination, aimed at transferring responsibility and legitimacy to local state institutions. It is a reconversion that signals discontinuity from past projection models (less direct control, more capacity-building), yet preserves structural ambiguities: legitimacy remains internal, while constraints and levers remain largely external.
The UNIFIL dilemma and the post-peacekeeping phase
The next UNIFIL mandate renewal cycle introduces a critical variable because it alters the stabilisation function: for decades, the UN force has operated as a buffer between Israel and Lebanon, ensuring relative stability grounded more in international presence than in Lebanese state capacity.
In this key, the transition toward a post-UNIFIL phase — with the Lebanese Armed Forces called to replace peacekeepers — is not a technical adjustment. It is a political and operational leap: a shift from an order “buffered” by external actors to one that requires effective internal coercive capacity, i.e., chain of command, legitimacy, and territorial control. This is where the transition becomes vulnerable: what has so far been guaranteed by international presence must be produced by domestic politics.
Further compounding this complexity is the explicitly progressive nature of the disarmament process. In Lebanese practice, authorities have referred to distinct phases: a first phase south of the Litani River, largely completed; a second phase up to the Awali River, politically far more sensitive; and only prospectively a possible extension to the rest of the country. This sequencing confirms that disarmament is not conceived as an immediate and total action, but as a gradual process exposed to the risk of stalling precisely in the most critical territorial and political segments.
At the same time, a post-2026 transition does not necessarily imply a full dismantling of the international presence. More often, it produces a redesign of the footprint: a lighter or differentiated presence, oriented toward maintaining a form of supervision and assistance without replicating the traditional peacekeeping model.
Post-UNIFIL is not a technical transition: it is the passage from externally guaranteed stability to an internal coercive sovereignty that is often contested.
The disarmament of Hezbollah and internal legitimacy
The central issue remains the disarmament of Hezbollah. Reducing this challenge to a matter of military capability would be misleading. Hezbollah is not merely an armed militia, but a political actor with parliamentary representation and deep social roots. In this context, disarmament is not a technical operation, but an act of renegotiation of internal power balances.
Pressure coming from the United States, which tends to insist on a rapid and unambiguous definition of Hezbollah as a terrorist organisation and on disarmament as a preliminary condition, collides with Lebanon’s internal political reality. France’s position appears more cautious and gradual, grounded in the strengthening of state institutions and the preservation of internal legitimacy, avoiding the forced disruption of already fragile political equilibria. This difference in approach creates tactical complementarity, but also reveals a fundamental strategic divergence between Washington and Paris.
In Lebanon, disarmament is not technical: it is domestic politics in coercive form..
External pressures and “strategic windows”
The regional context further contributes to the sensitivity of the Lebanese dossier. The relative weakening of Iran and the reactivation of the dialogue channel between Tehran and Washington are interpreted in Paris as the opening of a possible “window” for progress on the Lebanese file. This opportunistic logic—seizing transitional moments to attempt a restructuring of local equilibria—is not new in French diplomatic practice.
Such windows, however, are by definition unstable and reversible. The absence of direct control over the timing and priorities of the US–Iran dialogue severely limits Europe’s ability to transform these opportunities into durable, structural outcomes.
CSR Reading: structural continuity with the decline of the French vector
The Lebanese case illustrates how the decline of the French vector is not confined to Sub-Saharan Africa, but manifests itself as a structural dynamic in the Levant as well. In both contexts, Paris seeks to replace direct projection models with strategies of state capacity-building and multilateral frameworks, yet encounters the same underlying constraint: the centrality of internal legitimacy and the pluralisation of armed and political actors.
Lebanon thus becomes an imperfect laboratory of the new European posture: an attempt at managing instability rather than building order. It remains, however, a structural fact that Lebanon is прежде all a regional theatre, where decisive dynamics continue to be shaped by the interaction between Iran, Israel, the United States, and other regional actors. France’s—and Europe’s—capacity to exert influence therefore remains subordinated to broader regional equilibria, confirming the secondary and reactive nature of the European posture in the wider Mediterranean.
Further reading: the updated MST assessment of the macro-area. Middle East.
From the same series: When Europe finances but does not decide e Decline of French Influence in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Official source: UNIFIL – United Nations.

