Von der Leyen, dissent and European democracy: when opposition enters the threat perimeter

Von der Leyen, dissent and European democracy: when the opposition enters the threat zone

Von der Leyen, dissent and European democracy are at the centre of an increasingly significant institutional question.
From the 2022 “we have tools” remark to the Democracy Shield and the 2026 State of the Union address, the European Union has been developing increasingly sophisticated instruments to protect the information space and democratic processes from interference. On 16 September, however, Ursula von der Leyen placed ultranationalists, anti-Europeans, Russian interference and disinformation within the same threat framework. The strategic question, therefore, is where the boundary lies between defending democracy and defending the current European political project.

The Statement

The most sensitive passage in the State of the Union address delivered by Ursula von der Leyen on 16 September 2026 concerns more than Russia or disinformation.

===> It concerns the way in which the threat perimeter is defined.

The President of the European Commission states:

«Whether it is the ultranationalists or the anti-Europeans, whether it is Russian interference or disinformation, the names may be different, but their goal is the same.»

According to von der Leyen, these actors «despise our values» and seek to «shatter our European unity».

[Source: State of the Union Address 2026 – European Commission]

The passage raises a question:
when does a citizen, party or movement that challenges the current configuration of the European Union cease to be a political opponent and begin to be perceived as a threat from which the Union must defend itself?

The question arises from the framing used by the President herself.
Within the same passage, four profoundly different categories are placed side by side:

ultranationalism; anti-Europeanism; Russian interference; disinformation.

An interference operation conducted by a foreign power may constitute a threat to democratic sovereignty.

A coordinated information-manipulation campaign may constitute an instrument of influence or hybrid warfare.

An organisation that demonstrably pursues anti-democratic objectives may, under legally defined circumstances, represent a threat to the democratic order.

Being «anti-European», however, does not necessarily identify a form of conduct.

It may identify a political position. The distinction is substantial.

Von der Leyen, dissent and European democracy: the right to oppose

A democracy does not merely guarantee the right to choose between different policies within the system.
It also guarantees the possibility of democratically proposing the transformation of the system itself.

One may support greater European integration or call for powers to be returned to the Member States. One may advocate a federal Europe or a confederal one. One may challenge the euro or even democratically campaign for one’s own country to leave the Union.

These are political positions.

The question therefore becomes: does European democracy fully recognise the right to be politically opposed to the current European project?

In legal and formal terms, the answer remains yes.

The issue emerges when we examine the language through which part of this opposition is progressively described.

This dynamic is directly connected to what CSR has defined as Cognitive Power as Strategic Infrastructure: power does not necessarily operate on the final decision itself. It can act earlier, helping to shape the perimeter within which certain options appear legitimate, viable or necessary, while others become progressively more problematic.

2022: «We have tools»

The first significant precedent dates back to the Italian elections of September 2022.

A few days before the vote, when asked at Princeton University about a possible victory of the Italian right, von der Leyen stated that the Commission would work with any democratic government willing to work with the European Union.

She added, however: «If things go in a difficult direction […] we have tools.»

Her subsequent reference was to Hungary and Poland.

The remark triggered political controversy and also became the subject of a question in the European Parliament concerning possible interference by the Commission in the Italian elections.
The question, of course, represents the political position of its authors and does not constitute evidence that such interference occurred.

An institutional question nevertheless remains: who determines when the political direction democratically chosen by the voters of a Member State becomes a «difficult direction»?

(Source: European Parliament – E-003367/2022)

2024: the threat also comes from within

During the 2024 European election campaign, the language became even more explicit.

Von der Leyen identified several nationalist and Eurosceptic forces as a risk coming not only from outside Europe but also from within, and used a formulation that would later reappear: «The names may be different but the goal is the same.»

In 2024, however, there was a fundamental distinction.
Von der Leyen was also speaking as the European People’s Party candidate in an electoral contest. Criticism of political opponents therefore belonged to the normal dynamics of political competition.

The analytical issue emerges when we examine what happened subsequently.

In 2026, a very similar rhetorical construction moved from the language of party-political competition into the institutional language of democratic security.

The formulation reappeared: «the names may be different, but their goal is the same».

This time, the categories placed side by side were ultranationalists, anti-Europeans, Russian interference and disinformation.

The lexical continuity does not in itself demonstrate a normative shift.
It does, however, indicate continuity in the interpretative frame.

A question already raised within the European Institution

In January 2025, a parliamentary question formally raised an issue with the Commission under the significant title:

«Avoiding the impression of undue influence by the President of the Commission on the outcome of elections in Member States».

The question referred to Italy in 2022, Croatia in 2024 and France in 2024.

Here too, a clear distinction must be drawn between fact and interpretation: the allegations contained in the parliamentary question represent the position of the MEP who submitted it and do not constitute evidence of electoral interference by the Commission.

They do, however, show that the issue of the institutional neutrality of the President of the Commission had already been formally raised within the European institutions themselves before the 2026 address.

[Source: European Parliament – P-000116/2025]

Romania: from words to instruments

The 2024 Romanian presidential election represents a different and particularly important case.

Following the first round, won by Călin Georgescu, the Romanian authorities made public information concerning possible interference activities.

The Commission intervened within the scope of its powers under the Digital Services Act (DSA).

On 5 December 2024, it issued TikTok with a data retention order concerning systemic risks related to electoral processes. On 6 December, the European Board for Digital Services held an extraordinary meeting. On 17 December, the Commission opened formal proceedings against TikTok to assess compliance with DSA obligations concerning risks to electoral integrity.

Von der Leyen stated: «Whenever we suspect such interference, especially during elections, we have to act swiftly and firmly.»

An essential distinction must, however, be maintained.

It was not the European Commission that annulled the Romanian election.

The decision was taken by the Romanian Constitutional Court within the framework of the national legal order.

EU action concerned instead the digital ecosystem in which the electoral competition had taken place.

The distinction is crucial.

The case demonstrates something different and more structural: the Union now has regulatory instruments capable of intervening in the information environment in which national electoral preferences are formed.

Such intervention may be necessary to counter genuine foreign interference.

Precisely for this reason, evidentiary standards, transparency, proportionality and accountability become essential.

The institutional shift

In the meantime, Europe’s institutional architecture has expanded.

The Digital Services Act requires very large online platforms to assess and mitigate systemic risks, including those affecting electoral processes and civic discourse.

In November 2025, the European Democracy Shield was presented.

In February 2026, the European Centre for Democratic Resilience became operational.

The Centre is intended to strengthen Europe’s collective capacity to anticipate, detect and respond to threats to democracy, including Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) and disinformation.

Its mission includes situational awareness, early warning, rapid response and cooperation among Member States, EU institutions and independent stakeholders, including civil society, researchers and academia.

In other words, a genuine European architecture of cognitive resilience is taking shape.

This is not, in itself, a democratic anomaly.

A democracy must be able to identify and counter covert operations aimed at manipulating its decision-making processes.

But as the capacity for intervention increases, defining the boundaries within which that capacity is exercised becomes proportionally more important.

CSR has already observed a structurally similar dynamic in its analysis Sanctions as Systemic Coercion: when a political choice is translated into standards, procedures and technical mechanisms, the point at which power is exercised can become less immediately visible.

What FIMI really is?

This is where the examination of European technical documents produces perhaps the most important finding of the analysis.

The European External Action Service defines FIMI as a: «mostly non-illegal pattern of behaviour»

capable of negatively affecting values, procedures and political processes.

The activity must, however, have specific characteristics: it must be manipulative, intentional and coordinated.

Even more significant is the methodological criterion.

The European FIMI model is deliberately behaviour-centric.

In other words, the analysis prioritises the Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) of the operation over the political content being expressed.

Technical documentation commissioned by the EEAS explicitly explains the rationale: focusing on behaviour makes it possible to avoid political, social and cultural controversies concerning the content of information.

Source: EEAS – Information Integrity and Countering FIMI

This is a substantive safeguard.

It means that, based on the documentation examined, there is no indication of any European rule under which being Eurosceptic, sovereigntist, or opposed to European integration would, in itself, constitute a FIMI indicator.

The divergence to monitor

It is precisely this technical safeguard that makes the formulation used by von der Leyen more significant.

The technical framework essentially says: analyse behaviour, do not classify opinion.

The political discourse of 16 September, by contrast, constructs a single passage in which the following appear:

ultranationalists → anti-Europeans → Russian interference → disinformation → same goal.

They are not the same thing.

And the technical documents examined do not claim that they are.
But they are placed within the same political threat frame.

It is this divergence — not a non-existent legal equivalence — that CSR considers necessary to monitor.

Democracy Shield: freedom and resilience

The European Democracy Shield also contains explicit safeguards.

The Commission states that the system must enable Europeans to: «freely form and express their opinions»

and help keep European democracies: «strong, open and plural».

The mandate of the Centre for Democratic Resilience likewise specifies that defending democracy must not undermine the fundamental rights on which the democratic system is based, including freedom of expression.

Source: European Democracy Shield and Mission Statement of the Centre for Democratic Resilience

There is therefore no inherent contradiction between protecting the information space and safeguarding political freedom.

The contradiction would arise if the target ceased to be how an operation is conducted and became what is being politically advocated.

CSR Indicator — The Securitisation Threshold of Dissent

The critical threshold does not necessarily coincide with censorship.

It comes earlier.

It is reached when a political position, rather than concretely verifiable behaviour, itself becomes an independent risk indicator.

The analytical test can be formulated with relative precision.

As long as the focus remains on covert coordination, false identities, inauthentic automation, concealed funding, deliberate manipulation or operational links with foreign actors, the system is analysing behaviours.

If, instead, Euroscepticism, sovereigntism, opposition to integration, radical criticism of the Union or affiliation with particular political families were to become independently relevant, the system would begin to classify political orientations.

In the technical sources examined, there is currently no evidence that this second threshold has been crossed.

The language used by the Commission’s political leadership does, however, make it necessary to monitor that threshold.

From Resilience to the Governance of the Cognitive Space

The phenomenon becomes more significant when placed within the broader issue of Europe’s Real Decision-Making Margin.

The Commission has progressively become a regulatory, geopolitical and security actor.

At the same time, a network has developed in which the Commission Presidency and services, national authorities, Digital Services Coordinators, the European Board for Digital Services, the EEAS, the Centre for Democratic Resilience, researchers, civil society and other stakeholders contribute — with different powers and responsibilities — to protecting the European information space.

There is no need to hypothesise hidden structures.

The visible institutional architecture is already significant enough.

The question becomes: who defines the threat, on the basis of which indicators, through what decision-making chain and with what accountability mechanisms?

The greater the capacity to anticipate, detect and counter cognitive threats, the more important it becomes to preserve a verifiable separation between the security of the information environment and the content of political competition.

CSR Assessment

The sources analysed do not indicate the existence of a European policy formally aimed at suppressing anti-EU dissent.

To claim otherwise at this stage would go beyond the available evidence.

Three dynamics, however, are emerging simultaneously.

First: a growing European infrastructure designed to identify and counter threats to the information space and democratic processes, including activities that may be predominantly non-illegal.

Second: a growing institutional capacity to anticipate, detect, coordinate and respond to such threats.

Third: continuity in the political language of the President of the Commission, which tends to place certain forms of internal political opposition within the same narrative framework as external threats, interference and disinformation.

None of these three elements, taken in isolation, demonstrates an authoritarian transformation of the European Union.

Their convergence, however, constitutes an institutional indicator that warrants monitoring.

This is the analytically relevant point.

Conclusion

The issue is not whether Europe should defend itself against Russia, influence operations or electoral manipulation.

It must have the tools to do so, in accordance with its own legal order.

The issue is who safeguards the boundary between threat and dissent when those who possess the instruments needed to defend democracy also participate in the political definition of what democracy must be defended against.

Europe’s technical framework currently provides an important answer: assess behaviours, not opinions.

The words spoken by Ursula von der Leyen on 16 September, however, make that boundary less clear at the political level.

And that is precisely where the risk to be monitored lies.
A democracy must be able to identify and counter those who covertly seek to manipulate it.
But it must also fully preserve the right of its citizens to challenge it, change it and democratically propose an entirely different political architecture.

The day the content of dissent itself becomes an indicator of threat, we would no longer be dealing solely with the defence of democracy against manipulation.

We would be dealing with the defence of a particular political order against the possibilities for change offered by democracy itself.


CSR methodological note

The analysis systematically distinguishes between political position, manipulative behaviour, foreign interference, disinformation and institutional action.

Political statements are analysed separately from the European Union’s regulatory and operational instruments. Parliamentary questions are used as evidence that an institutional challenge has been raised, not as proof of the allegations made by their authors.

The assessment does not assume the existence of a European policy aimed at suppressing dissent in the absence of documentary evidence. The monitoring criterion adopted is the potential shift from a behaviour-based classification of threats to one based on political content or orientation.

The analysis forms part of CSR’s Cognitive Power framework, understood as the capacity to influence the perimeter within which information, options and decisions are perceived as plausible, legitimate or viable.

Further reading: the updated MST assessment of the macro-area. European Union.

Related CSR Readings

Cognitive Power as Strategic Infrastructure
CSR’s theoretical framework for analysing how standards, narratives, regulation and information architectures can influence the range of politically viable options.

Europe’s Real Decision-Making Margin
An analysis of the gap between formal sovereignty and the effective capacity to bear the costs of autonomous decisions.

European Cooperation as a Capacity Multiplier or Centralisation as an Error Multiplier?
The systemic issue of European centralisation and the propagation of decision-making errors.

Sanctions as Systemic Coercion: Energy, Payments and the Fragmentation of Global Governance
How political decisions can become embedded in standards, compliance mechanisms and technical procedures, altering the cost of divergence.

Main External Sources

European Commission — State of the Union Address 2026, 16 September 2026.

European Commission — European Democracy Shield, institutional documentation.

European Commission — European Centre for Democratic Resilience, mandate and mission statement.

European External Action Service — Information Integrity and Countering Foreign Information Manipulation & Interference (FIMI).

EEAS — Study on International Norms for Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI), April 30, 2024..

European Commission — Digital Services Act: formal proceedings against TikTok on election risks, December 17, 2024.

European Board for Digital Services — Ad hoc meeting on the Romanian elections, December 6, 2024.

European Parliament — E-003367/2022, Political interference by the Commission in the affairs of Member States.

EEuropean Parliament — P-000116/2025, Avoiding the impression of undue influence by the President of the Commission on the outcome of elections in Member States.