How Active Wars Are Compressing the International System

How Active Wars Are Compressing the International System

From the plurality of conflicts to the convergence of effects

The international landscape is no longer readable as a simple sum of regional crises. The ongoing dynamics are more insidious: formally distinct active wars are beginning to produce convergent effects on the same support systems of the international order.

We are not yet facing a unitary war, nor a political fusion of the theaters. But we are already in a phase of negative interdependence among wars that act simultaneously on energy, logistics, allied cohesion, the legitimacy of the use of force, humanitarian continuity, and the overall absorption capacity of the system.

The decisive point is therefore not the number of open fronts. It is the fact that every new crisis does not merely add damage: it reduces the system's capacity to manage the others.

It is at this qualitative threshold that today’s greatest strategic risk lies.

The Gulf as a systemic multiplier

The war between the United States, Israel, and Iran has now surpassed the dimensions of a simple regional crisis. Although it has inflicted significant damage on the Iranian apparatus, the Western campaign has not produced a rapid closure of the military cycle nor a linear translation of tactical superiority into stable political outcome.

Conversely, Tehran retains the capacity for retaliation, indirect leverage, and sufficient margins to maintain pressure on maritime traffic and the global energy economy. In this context, wartime itself becomes a resource: the longer the conflict lasts, the greater the economic, political, and diplomatic costs for Washington and its partners.

The Strait of Hormuz remains the central node of this dynamic. As long as that chokepoint remains partially compressed, the war in the Gulf does not remain confined to the Middle East: it transforms into a structural pressure on oil, gas, maritime insurance, inflation, and global logistics.

Update (July 2026): the 6 April deadline led neither to an immediate negotiated closure nor to a prolonged escalation in the sense envisaged by the base scenario. Less than an hour before the ultimatum, on 7–8 April 2026, Trump announced a two-week bilateral ceasefire with Iran, mediated by Pakistan and approved by Khamenei after Chinese pressure. The subsequent talks in Pakistan failed, however, and on 11–13 April the United States imposed a naval blockade on Hormuz with mine-clearing operations. The conflict then dragged on for weeks in a phase of brinkmanship over access to the strait, until the memorandum of understanding announced by the mediators on 14 June 2026, which formally ended 107 days of war with a gradual and extendable lifting of the blockade.

Ukraine and the normalization of war against infrastructure

The Russian war against Ukraine continues to represent the most advanced model of conflict against urban and infrastructure resilience. Targeting thermal power plants, substations, distribution networks, and essential services means turning energy into a tool of strategic coercion.

However, the Ukrainian theater is not a one-way process. Kyiv also strikes Russian energy and industrial hubs, in particular refineries and infrastructure with logistical and export value. This outlines a form of a reciprocal but asymmetric energy war: on one side, Russian pressure on civilian resilience; on the other, the Ukrainian attempt to degrade industrial and logistical capabilities.

This passage has broader significance. It shows that the war on infrastructure tends to become a normalized method of strategic pressure. This is where the Ukrainian theater dialogues indirectly with that of the Gulf: not because the cases are identical, but because the distance between the languages and practices by which the actors seek to compress their opponent’s ability to function is reduced.

Lebanon and Yemen: the lateral spread of the crisis

The Lebanese front is no longer readable as a simple appendage to the war with Iran. It is a theater of lateral spread that amplifies the political and strategic cost of the main conflict. Lebanon today acts as a degraded absorption space: an already fragile system is forced to endure a war that greatly exceeds its internal dynamics.

To this external pressure is added the internal one. The Lebanese government’s attempt to limit or ban the military component of Hezbollah signals a desire for state recovery on the one hand, but on the other exposes the country to the further risk of domestic fragmentation. In this sense, Lebanon is not just an additional front: it is a possible point of accelerated internal disintegration.

The Yemen–Red Sea–Suez quadrant also has a value that goes beyond the immediate intensity of the attacks. If Hormuz is the eastern chokepoint of world energy, the Red Sea is the second line of vulnerability, the commercial and logistical one. The mere possibility that a double pressure on Hormuz and on the Suez/Bab el-Mandeb corridor becomes entrenched raises insurance costs, pushes rerouting and reduces the predictability of global flows.

It is not necessary for both fronts to collapse simultaneously for the system to come under strain. It is enough for the perception of simultaneous vulnerability to be strengthened in multiple nodes that are not easily replaceable.

Inner Asia: the periphery that consumes management capacity

The Pakistan-Afghanistan front today does not have the strategic centrality of the Gulf or Ukraine, but its significance should not be underestimated. The border clashes, raids, displacements, and the need for Chinese mediation show that even the margins of the system are consuming management capacity.

At a time when the main theaters are already absorbing attention, resources, and priorities, any increase in peripheral instability further reduces the overall absorption margin. This is the true analytical value of the Pakistan-Afghanistan dossier: not so much its ability to redefine the global balance on its own, but the fact that it signals that instability is spreading to the less visible fronts as well.

Chinese mediation also adds a significant political element. While Washington remains absorbed by high-intensity theaters, Beijing is increasing its visibility as a manager of unstable peripheries. It is not yet a role reversal, but it is a sign of selective redistribution of diplomatic function.

Africa and the limits of humanitarian chains

The Sudan is one of the clearest cases of cross-interference between distant wars. The war in the Gulf does not only hit markets and energy routes: it also slows medical supplies, logistics chains and assistance flows directed to already extremely fragile African theatres.

Here a point often overlooked emerges. The global aid system is not designed to absorb simultaneous shocks on maritime routes, air corridors, energy costs and competing geopolitical priorities. When a crisis in the Gulf compromises the capacity to provide assistance in Sudan, we are not simply faced with two parallel wars. We are facing a loss of structural elasticity in the international system.

This applies not only to Sudan. It applies more generally to the whole set of humanitarian and commercial supply chains which, under simultaneous pressure, are starting to show saturation limits.

Three possible trajectories after April 6

In the weeks following April 6, the picture could evolve along three main trajectories.

The first, the most likely, is that of a protracted negotiation with controlled friction. In this scenario, Washington avoids for now a leap to systematic escalation against Iranian energy infrastructure, while keeping coercion high. Iran continues to use time as a resource and systemic compression grows gradually.

The second is that of a escalation with double compression of the chokepoints. In this case, a perceived failure of the 6 April juncture could open the way to new attacks on Iranian energy infrastructure and a harsher asymmetric response from Tehran and its proxies. If a more intense reactivation of the Red Sea front were added to Hormuz, the qualitative leap would be evident: the war in the Gulf would not add to the others, but would amplify them simultaneously.

The third, less likely, is a partial de-escalation. In this case too, it would not be a real stabilization, but rather a temporary easing of pressure, without rebuilding the already eroded architectures of trust. The system would breathe, but it would remain vulnerable.

The actual outcome (July 2026): of the three trajectories envisaged, the one that materialised was a protracted negotiation much longer than expected, with an intermediate naval blockade phase (11–13 April) before formal closure with the memorandum of 14 June 2026, after 107 days of conflict. Meanwhile, the Lebanese front saw a US–Lebanon–Israel framework agreement signed on 26 June, which Hezbollah did not sign.

The real threshold: not a single war, but progressive saturation

The most important fact is that none of the main scenarios automatically lead to a classic world war. However, all of them reinforce the same underlying trajectory: a growing systemic compression.

The difference between the various developments does not concern the existence or non-existence of pressure, but its speed and its ability to produce qualitative leaps.

The greatest strategic risk therefore does not necessarily lie in a single catastrophic event. It lies in the grey zone of diffuse friction: in the progressive reduction of the international system's capacity to absorb simultaneous shocks to energy, alliances, logistics, norms and aid.

It is here that the distinction between separate crises begins to lose analytical utility. And it is here that the international system appears more vulnerable today.

The Gulf conflict ended through negotiation in June 2026, confirming that diffuse friction can also be resolved without a qualitative leap towards open war.

For the theatre-by-theatre analysis (Gulf, Ukraine, Levant, Yemen and the Red Sea, Pakistan-Afghanistan, Sudan): Active Conflicts and Systemic Compression.

Further reading: the updated global systemic state in the GSA Dashboard.