Active Conflicts and Systemic Compression

Active Conflicts and Systemic Compression

Active Conflicts and Systemic Compression: Converging Effects Across the Gulf, Ukraine, the Levant, Inner Asia, and Africa

Date: 3 April 2026

1. General overview

As of 3 April 2026, the international environment can no longer be understood as the simple sum of regional crises.

The emerging dynamic is more complex and potentially more destabilising: formally distinct conflicts are beginning to generate converging effects on the very systems that sustain the international order.

A single, unified war has not yet emerged, nor have the various theatres politically merged. Yet a pattern of negative interdependence is already evident among conflicts that simultaneously affect energy, logistics, allied cohesion, the legitimacy of the use of force, humanitarian continuity, and the overall absorptive capacity of the international system.

At this stage, the central point is not the number of open fronts, but the fact that each new crisis does not simply add to the damage: it reduces the system’s ability to manage the others. The dominant risk, at present, is not a “world war” in the classical sense, but a phase of widespread systemic friction, in which several distinct theaters begin to simultaneously erode the same stabilizing structures.

2. The Gulf theatre: war with Iran and an incomplete strategic payoff

The US-Israel-Iran war, which began on 28 February 2026, has entered its second month without producing either a rapid closure of the military cycle or a linear translation of Western tactical superiority into a stable political-strategic outcome. Washington continues to threaten further attacks on Iranian infrastructure, while the Hormuz knot remains unresolved and international shipping continues to suffer from it.

The campaign has inflicted significant damage on the Iranian apparatus, but it has produced neither the collapse of the regime nor an immediate negotiated surrender. On the contrary, Tehran retains retaliatory capabilities, residual missile margins, indirect levers and the ability to keep a threshold of pressure on maritime traffic and the global energy economy. A war designed to break Iran risks leaving the Gulf more exposed and Tehran still able to impose strategic costs.

A decisive nuance must be added: the American posture oscillates between messages of near-closure and extreme threats. Trump has suspended new attacks on Iranian energy facilities until 6 April 2026, declaring that the talks “are going very well”, but has maintained the threat to strike if the Strait is not reopened. A negotiating window exists, but it is narrow, highly coercive and subordinate to the Hormuz dossier.

The essential point remains this: wartime itself is becoming an Iranian resource. If Washington aimed for a short, coercive and decisive campaign, the prolongation of the conflict produces the opposite effect: it increases economic costs, widens tensions with allies, consumes domestic political capital and makes it harder to build an orderly exit strategy.

Update (July 2026): the 6 April deadline led neither to an immediate negotiated closure nor to a prolonged escalation in the sense envisaged by the base scenario. Less than an hour before the ultimatum, on 7–8 April 2026, Trump announced a two-week bilateral ceasefire with Iran, mediated by Pakistan and approved by Khamenei after Chinese pressure. The subsequent talks in Pakistan failed, however, and on 11–13 April the United States imposed a naval blockade on Hormuz with mine-clearing operations. The conflict then dragged on for weeks in a phase of brinkmanship over access to the strait, until the memorandum of understanding announced by the mediators on 14 June 2026, which formally ended 107 days of war with a gradual and extendable lifting of the blockade.

3. Ukraine: War against resilience and asymmetric energy reciprocity

The Russian war against Ukraine continues to represent the most advanced model of conflict against urban and infrastructure resilience. The picture emerging in recent weeks confirms an already established logic: striking thermal power plants, substations, distribution networks, heating systems, and essential services to compress the capacity of ordinary life in cities and transform energy into a tool of strategic coercion.

The Ukrainian theater therefore remains the main laboratory of the war against the civil support system. However, it would be reductive to represent it as a one-way process. Ukraine continues to strike Russian refineries, depots, and energy hubs. It is therefore more correct to speak of a mutual, but asymmetrical, energy war: Moscow primarily targets urban resilience and civilian support; Kyiv instead aims to degrade Russian industrial, logistical, and export capabilities.

This reciprocity does not diminish the significance of the Ukrainian case; it strengthens it. Indeed, it shows that the war against energy infrastructure tends to become a normalized method of strategic pressure. In this context, the parallel with the Gulf should not be forced, but recorded: at the cognitive and normative level, the distance between Western language and practices that the West has long denounced as belonging to its adversaries is reduced.

4. Levant: Lebanon as a theater of lateral spread and possible internal fracture

The Israeli-Lebanese front is no longer readable as a simple appendix to the war with Iran. It is now a theater of lateral spread with its own strategic significance. The conflict between Hezbollah and Israel has entered its second month, with over a million displaced people and more than 1,300 deaths in Lebanon; Prime Minister Nawaf Salam has stated that there is no imminent end in sight.

Lebanon today performs three systemic functions. The first is that of a degraded absorption space: an already fragile country finds itself sustaining a war that exceeds its internal dynamics. The second is that of a regional political resonance chamber, because every development on the Lebanese front directly affects the posture of Israel, Iran and Western actors. The third is that of a factor of indirect international involvement, also because of the consequences for the UNIFIL mission and hence the implications for European countries, Italy included.

A second line of risk must, however, be added: the Salam government's attempt to ban or disarm Hezbollah's military component is strategically understandable but politically high-risk. Lebanon risks becoming not only a theatre of lateral propagation, but also a theatre of accelerated internal decomposition, in which regional pressure fuses with domestic fractures.

Update (July 2026): On June 26, 2026, a tripartite framework agreement supported by the United States was signed in Washington between the USA, Lebanon, and Israel, in 14 points: disarmament of non-state armed groups, dismantling of related military infrastructure, return of the authority of the Lebanese armed forces, and redeployment of the IDF outside Lebanese territory. Hezbollah did not sign the agreement and rejects the binding clause that conditions Israeli withdrawal on its disarmament; Nabih Berri and the Amal movement consider it biased in favor of Israel, while the Salam government and President Joseph Aoun read it as a tool to regain sovereignty over the south of the country. On June 30, the security annex to the agreement was announced (pilot zones in the South Litani Sector, active monitoring mechanism, third-party certification).

5. Yemen and the Red Sea: Second line of compression on the choke points

The Houthis' more visible entry into the current phase of the war confirms that the Middle Eastern conflict has a geographical and operational depth broader than the Gulf alone. On 28 March the Houthis launched their first attacks on Israel since the start of the current war and pledged to continue operations.

The systemic value of this theatre depends not only on the current intensity of operations, but on its potential function of duplicating the crisis. If Hormuz is the eastern chokepoint of world energy, the Yemen–Red Sea–Suez quadrant is the second line of vulnerability, the logistical and commercial one. The mere possibility that a double pressure on Hormuz and on the Red Sea/Suez corridor becomes entrenched raises insurance costs, pushes rerouting and reduces the predictability of global trade.

6. Pakistan-Afghanistan: a peripheral front with high volatility and growing Chinese visibility

The Pakistan-Afghanistan theater does not have the strategic centrality of the Gulf or Ukraine today, but it cannot be dismissed as a secondary crisis. Talks are underway in Urumqi, under Chinese mediation, to halt the most serious months of clashes since the Taliban returned to power in 2021. The conflict has already produced raids, civilian casualties, and large movements of displaced people.

The significance of this front is not to redefine the overall balance on its own, but to show that even the margins of the system are consuming management capacity. At a time when the main theaters are already absorbing attention, resources, and priorities, every increase in peripheral instability further reduces the overall absorption margin.

A broader political point must also be made explicit: Chinese mediation signals Beijing's growing visibility as a manager of unstable peripheries while Washington remains absorbed by high-intensity fronts. It is not yet a reversal of roles on a global scale, but it is a signal consistent with a selective redistribution of diplomatic function.

7. Sudan: humanitarian interference between distant wars and congestion in supply chains

Sudan is the clearest case of cross-interference between distant theaters. Essential medical supplies for about 90 Sudanese clinics risk running out in a few weeks because the conflict in the Gulf has disrupted routes, increased costs, and blocked medicines in the ports of Dubai.

An often underestimated element emerges here: the global aid system is not designed to absorb simultaneous shocks to maritime routes, air corridors, energy costs and competing geopolitical priorities. When a crisis in the Gulf reduces assistance capacity in Sudan, the system is not simply suffering two wars: it is losing structural elasticity.

The effect is not limited to Sudan. The expansion of the war in the Middle East puts global aid flows at risk and creates logistical congestion that hits other African and Asian theatres. Sudan thus becomes the revealing case of a broader saturation of humanitarian and commercial supply chains.

8. Overall assessment

The prevailing trend is therefore the following: a plurality of theaters, a convergence of effects. We are not yet facing a unified political fusion of conflicts, but we are already in a phase where open wars are hitting the very pillars of systemic functioning.

The first architecture under pressure is Western allied cohesion. European resistance to American operational demands in the Gulf does not equate to a comprehensive break-up of NATO, but it does show a growing functional divergence between the European and the Middle Eastern theaters.

The second architecture under pressure is global energy and logistics security. Hormuz, the Red Sea, Ukrainian power grids, Russian refineries: the nodes hit are different, but they belong to the same ecosystem of circulation and support. War thus returns to striking the points where the system is most efficient, and therefore most vulnerable.

The third architecture under pressure is the normative-cognitive one. If more actors, including Western actors, threaten or carry out attacks on essential infrastructure, the West’s ability to claim a clear superiority in method is reduced.

The fourth architecture under pressure is the humanitarian and emergency-management one. Sudan and Lebanon show that different wars obstruct each other also in the sphere of assistance, displacement and administrative resilience. The more the simultaneity of shocks increases, the more the international system enters a logic of saturation.

9. Indicators of a possible fusion between theatres

At the moment, a unified political convergence of the conflicts is not yet observed. However, some indicators merit strengthened monitoring because they could signal a next, more serious step:

• outcome of the April 6, 2026 deadline on the Hormuz dossier: further American strikes or signs of a negotiated de-escalation;

• evolution of the residual Iranian missile capability and asymmetric responses, also via proxies or cyber;

• possible more explicit coordination between the Iran–Hezbollah–Houthi axis and other actors hostile to the West on anti-infrastructure tactics;

• simultaneous intensification of pressures on energy and logistical choke points;

• further European resistance to US operational requests outside NATO's strictly defensive perimeter;

• worsening of humanitarian interference between theaters, with systematic blockages or delays in the relief chains;

• the evolution of the Lebanese ban on Hezbollah and the real ability of the state to support it without exacerbating the internal rift;

• failure of the Urumqi talks and resumption of the Pakistan-Afghanistan front;

• possible clearer competition between Western strategic priorities: Ukraine, the Gulf, the Indo-Pacific.

These are not yet signs of a fusion of the conflicts, but they are the main threshold signals to watch in order to understand whether the system is moving from diffuse friction to Critical Convergence.

10. Post-April 6 scenarios

Evolution of systemic compression between the Gulf, Ukraine, Levant, Inner Asia and Africa.

The probabilities assigned to the scenarios have no statistical predictive value, but they express a comparative analytical estimate based on the incentives of the actors, available operational signals, political-strategic constraints, and the degree of systemic pressure already observable.

Base scenario

Estimated probability: medium-high (50–60%) | Summary formula: protracted negotiation with controlled friction

In the Gulf, the most likely scenario is that Washington chooses not to immediately turn the April 6 deadline into an automatic threshold for escalation, but to use it as a lever of political and negotiating pressure. A new technical postponement or a “tactical pause” of a few days is plausible, justified by progress in negotiations or the need for coordination with Asian and European partners on the maritime security issue.

The US/Israeli attacks would most likely continue on military targets, the IRGC, and select infrastructure, but without immediately moving to a systematic campaign against civilian power plants and networks. Iran would maintain its current line: avoid a final frontal rupture, continue to use time as a resource, maintain missile and asymmetric capabilities, and maintain a pressure threshold on Hormuz high enough to weigh on markets and supply chains without triggering the maximum escalation.

The systemic effects would remain high but contained: tight energy prices, high insurance costs, persistent naval rerouting, further friction along logistics chains. There would be no sudden shock, but gradual corrosion.

On the other theaters, the most plausible scenario would be this: in Ukraine, Moscow would try to exploit Western distraction by selectively intensifying its energy pressure, while Kyiv would continue its campaign against Russian refineries and logistics hubs; in Lebanon, the Salam government would continue its attempt to limit Hezbollah’s military autonomy, but with a high risk of exacerbating internal tensions; in Yemen, the Houthis would maintain a calibrated level of activity, without a full reopening of the shipping front; in Pakistan-Afghanistan, the Urumqi talks would continue slowly under Chinese mediation; in Sudan and other fragile theaters, the humanitarian congestion would continue to worsen incrementally.

Net outcome: systemic compression grows, but without a qualitative leap. The negotiating window remains open, albeit narrow and coercive. Time continues to work more in favour of Iranian attrition than of a rapid Western closure.

Escalation scenario

Estimated probability: medium (25–35%) | Summary formula: resumption of energy strikes and double compression of the chokepoints

This scenario would be triggered if Washington judged the 6 April juncture a failure or if Iran were perceived as engaged in delaying tactics incompatible with American objectives. In that case, the US and Israel could move to a harsher phase, including extensive attacks on Iranian energy infrastructure, power plants, distribution networks and other essential nodes.

Iran's response in this scenario would not be symmetrical but strongly asymmetrical: mines, drones, missiles against maritime traffic, regional proxies, more aggressive pressure on Hormuz and a possible hardening of the coercive toll system or selective interdiction. If more assertive Houthi moves in the Red Sea were added to this, the system would face a double compression of the chokepoints: Hormuz to the east, Bab el-Mandeb/Suez to the west.

The systemic effects would be nonlinear: further surge in oil and LNG prices, greater naval congestion, strong financial volatility, strengthening inflationary pressures and worsening tensions between Western allies over the management of maritime security.

In other theaters, the effect would be amplification. In Ukraine, Russia would have an additional incentive to intensify attacks against civilian and energy infrastructure, taking advantage of the US/NATO political-military distraction. In Lebanon, Hezbollah could increase its level of involvement, making a deeper Israeli penetration into the south more likely and accelerating the internal political disintegration of Lebanon. In Pakistan-Afghanistan, the Urumqi talks could freeze or fail, while in Sudan and other fragile humanitarian theaters the supply chains would undergo a new shock.

Net outcome: this is where the real qualitative leap would occur. The war in the Gulf would not simply add to the others: it would amplify them simultaneously, reducing allied cohesion, aggravating the energy-logistics crisis and further saturating global humanitarian capacity.

Partial de-escalation scenario

Estimated probability: low (15–20%) | Summary formula: limited framework agreement and temporary breathing space

This scenario assumes that the American threat over 6 April manages to produce a minimal compromise: at least partial reopening of Hormuz, forms of guarantee or indirect verification, a possible selective easing of pressure or a political declaration of “objectives achieved” by Trump. It is consistent with the White House continuing to insist on negotiating progress, but it is not currently the most likely scenario, because trust remains low and coercion remains the main language of the negotiation.

In this scenario, operational intensity in the Gulf would decrease without disappearing. Iran would retain residual missile capability, proxies and regional levers; the United States would try to turn a partial truce into a success narrative; Israel would remain more cautious on energy infrastructure.

The systemic effects would only improve partially: a reduction in the tension on energy flows, a reduction in the risk premium, an easing of some logistical bottlenecks, a relative benefit for the humanitarian chains that are most exposed, including Sudan.

However, de-escalation would not automatically transfer to the other theatres. Ukraine would remain an autonomous high-intensity theatre; Lebanon and Yemen could cool down only partially; Chinese mediation in inner Asia would emerge strengthened if the Urumqi talks produced concrete results.

Net outcome: temporary systemic breathing space, not a reversal of the trend. The stabilisation architectures would remain eroded, and the risk of re-escalation would remain high if the implicit conditions of the understanding were not respected.

11. Overall assessment and threshold indicators after April 6

None of the three scenarios automatically lead to a “world war” in the classical sense. However, all confirm the same underlying trajectory: increasing systemic compression. The difference between them lies not in the existence or non-existence of pressure, but in its speed and its ability to produce qualitative leaps.

The priority indicators to monitor in the 7–14 days following April 6 are the following:

• Trump’s announcement regarding the April 6 deadline and Iran’s reaction regarding Hormuz;

• possible resumption of systematic energy strikes against Iran;

• intensity and coordination of asymmetric attacks by Hezbollah, Houthi and other proxies;

• the evolution of the Lebanese ban on Hezbollah and the Israeli stance in southern Lebanon;

• concrete results from the Urumqi talks;

• data on humanitarian stocks in Sudan and further signs of congestion in regional supply chains;

• European and NATO reactions in the Gulf and their relationship with the Ukraine priority;

• any signs of tactical coordination against infrastructure between theaters.

12. Conclusions

The international system is not yet entering a single war. It is, however, entering a phase in which distinct conflicts are beginning to erode simultaneously the same stabilization structures. This is the main point.

The risk is not only the geographical widening of the theatres. The most serious risk is the progressive fusion of their effects on energy, alliances, logistics, humanitarian capacity and the legitimacy of the use of force. At this stage, every additional war does not only produce new damage: it reduces the system's absorption margin with respect to all the others.

After April 6, the transition from a plurality of crises to the negative interdependence of their effects will be more visible. The baseline scenario indicates a slow but steady erosion; the escalation scenario foresees a nonlinear acceleration of systemic saturation. The main strategic risk remains in the gray area of widespread friction: not a single catastrophic event, but the progressive reduction of the international system’s ability to absorb simultaneous shocks.

With hindsight, the scenario that materialised is closer to the base scenario envisaged in this article (protracted negotiation with controlled friction) than to the escalation scenario: the conflict ended through negotiation after more than three months, confirming that time, more than rupture, was the decisive variable.

Further reading: the updated global systemic state in the GSA Dashboard.

Essential bibliography (Chicago)

Al Jazeera. “How Are NATO Allies Pushing Back Against Trump’s Iran War Demands?” Al Jazeera, April 1, 2026.

Al Jazeera. “Trump Postpones U.S. Strikes on Iranian Power Grid to April 6 amid Talks.” Al Jazeera, March 26, 2026.

Associated Press. “China Says Peace Talks between Afghanistan and Pakistan Are Advancing.” AP News, April 3, 2026.

Chatham House. “The Iran War Exposes the Limits of Russia’s Leverage in a Fragmenting Regional Order.” Chatham House, March 2026.

Chatham House. “The Iran War Risks Triggering a New Wave of Nuclear Proliferation.” Chatham House, March 30, 2026.

Chatham House. “With Iran Attacks, President Trump Is Making the Use of Force a New Normal.” Chatham House, March 2026.

International Institute for Strategic Studies. “Mapping the Damage: Iranian Strikes on the GCC.” IISS, March 2026.

International Institute for Strategic Studies. “The Risks of Kinetic Counter-Proliferation.” IISS, March 2026.

International Institute for Strategic Studies. “Who Is Winning the Middle East War?” IISS, March 2026.

ISPI. “Global Watch n. 217 – Energy tensions: the impact of the war in the Gulf.” Italian Institute for International Political Studies, March 20, 2026.

ISPI. “Hormuz: is a new coalition emerging?” Italian Institute for International Political Studies, April 2, 2026.

ISPI. “The energy crisis is here: 6 charts on the impact of the war in the Gulf.” Italian Institute for International Political Studies, April 3, 2026.

Reuters. “A Month into War, Lebanon’s Prime Minister Says No End in Sight.” April 2, 2026.

Reuters. “Sudan Clinics Could Run Out of Supplies in Weeks Due to Middle East War, Warns NGO.” March 17, 2026.

Reuters. “Trump Says He Will Pause Attacks on Iran’s Energy Plants; Talks Going Very Well.” March 26, 2026.

Reuters. “Trump Vows to Hit More Iranian Infrastructure as Nations Seek to Open Hormuz.” April 3, 2026.