Iran in the international system: pressure, deterrence and systemic propagation.

Iran in the international system: pressure, deterrence and systemic propagation.

Iran as a multi-domain pressure node between energy, security and global decision-making architectures.

In the contemporary international system, Iran and systemic pressure are closely interconnected: the country represents one of the principal nodes capable of generating effects that propagate simultaneously across the energy, military, logistical, financial and cognitive domains.

Its relevance derives not only from its military capabilities or regional competition, but from the position it occupies within the key architectures of vulnerability of the global system.

Systemic nature

Within the CSR framework, Iran is not analysed as an isolated actor, but as a generator of multidomain pressure.

Its actions do not produce effects limited to the bilateral or regional level. Instead, they tend to transmit pressure along the main lines of connectivity of the international system: energy flows, critical infrastructure, trade routes, security systems and decision-making processes.

In this sense, Iran’s strategic behaviour is not limited to deterrence or direct confrontation. It is expressed through its ability to activate, amplify or destabilise existing configurations of pressure.

Energy and chokepoint (HORMUZ)

The first level of this pressure concerns energy.

The Strait of Hormuz represents one of the main chokepoints of the global economy. A significant share of global oil and liquefied natural gas trade passes through this corridor.

When tensions concentrate on this node, the effects do not remain confined to the Gulf. They immediately propagate to markets, insurance, logistics, inflation and global macroeconomic stability.

In this context, Iran is not merely a regional actor: it is one of the factors directly affecting the operational continuity of the international energy system.

—> Hormuz is not just a strait

Systemic propagation

The second level concerns the propagation of pressure.

Crises involving Iran tend not to remain confined to their theatre of origin. Instead, they develop along three main vectors:

— intra-domain, within the same functional space
— inter-domain, across energy, security, finance and logistics
— inter-macro-area, with transmission towards Europe, Asia and global markets

This mechanism transforms a localised tension into a systemic configuration capable of simultaneously altering multiple equilibria.

—> From Chokepoint to Systemic Tension

Security and proxy

The third level concerns security.

Iran has historically operated through a combination of direct deterrence, strategic depth and indirect projection through proxy actors.
The cycle that began on 28 February 2026, however, moved beyond this pattern.
The joint US-Israeli attack (Operations “Roaring Lion” and “Operation Epic Fury”) and the subsequent killing of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei resulted in a direct, large-scale military confrontation, to which Iran responded with missile and drone attacks against Israel and US bases in the Gulf (Operation “True Promise 4”, 1 March 2026).
Far from being avoided, direct confrontation became the primary instrument of the 2026 crisis cycle, before giving way to a ceasefire phase (8 April 2026) and subsequent negotiations (MoU of 14–15 June 2026).

The result is a dynamic in which the threat is not concentrated, but distributed, adaptive and persistent.

The war February - June 2026

On 28 February 2026, the United States and Israel simultaneously struck military, nuclear, and command targets in Iran, killing Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Iran responded the following day with a large-scale missile and drone attack against Israel and US bases in the Gulf, and on 4 March announced the closure of the Strait of Hormuz.

On 8 March, the Assembly of Experts designated Mojtaba Khamenei, son of the slain leader, as the new Supreme Leader, with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps pledging allegiance — a succession that took place under direct military attack rather than under conditions of institutional normality.

The conflict ended with a ceasefire on 8 April 2026 and a memorandum of understanding on 14–15 June, but tensions over the Strait of Hormuz resurfaced in late June with a renewed exchange of strikes.

Cognitive dimension

This dimension is compounded by an often underestimated layer: the cognitive domain.

The pressure generated by Iran affects not only infrastructure and material flows, but also risk perception, market expectations, and the decision-making timelines of international actors.

In highly interdependent environments, even a perceived threat can produce tangible effects by triggering anticipatory reactions, altering behaviour, and constraining decision-making space.

Conclusion

Update July 2026

The events of February–June 2026 confirm and reinforce this assessment. The war that began on 28 February, the killing of the Supreme Leader and the succession of Mojtaba Khamenei show that the systemic pressure generated by Iran is no longer limited to indirect projection, but now also includes the risk of direct confrontation capable of reshaping the country’s leadership itself. If anything, the Iran node remains even more central than previously described.

Further update end of July

The June memorandum did not bring the cycle to a close. By late July, the pressure generated by the Iranian node had propagated further, drawing a new state actor into the conflict: on 29 July, Saudi Arabia entered the war with joint US-Saudi strikes against pro-Iranian militias in Iraq, following the Houthi blockade of Bab el-Mandeb (20 July) and attacks on Saudi oil facilities.

The sequence empirically confirms the multidomain and inter-macro-area nature of the pressure described in this Node: energy, security and the normative framework — Iraqi sovereignty — converge into a single configuration.

Update 23 September 2026

Developments since late July reinforce the assessment of Iran as a multidomain pressure node, while introducing an additional element: the capacity of this pressure to propagate now manifests itself through geographically distinct and potentially converging vectors.

Hormuz - direct pressure over energetic node
The Strait continues to operate under severely degraded conditions.

Commercial traffic remains well below pre-conflict levels, and the persistence of the disruption confirms that Hormuz no longer represents merely a potential risk, but an active element of the regional configuration.

Pressure exerted in this area continues to propagate into energy, insurance, maritime transport, and international markets.

Bab el-Mandeb — extension of pressure to the second corridor.
During September, the advance of Houthi forces along Yemen’s Red Sea coast increased pressure on the Bab el-Mandeb–Suez system.

Regional and Iranian sources cited by Reuters indicate an Iranian contribution in terms of weapons and assistance; the G7 subsequently called on Tehran to end its military support for the Houthis.

This configuration does not imply that Tehran exercises uniform operational control over allied actors, nor that every Houthi action is directly determined by Iran. The systemically relevant factor is instead the convergence of effects: direct pressure on Hormuz, indirect pressure on Bab el-Mandeb, vulnerability of Saudi energy infrastructure, and growing interaction between security, energy and logistics.

Multi-domain propagation

Compared with the configuration described in July, the most significant change therefore does not simply consist of an increase in the intensity of the confrontation.
The pressure associated with the Iranian node simultaneously affects multiple mechanisms underpinning the continuity of the regional system and may reduce the ability of actors to compensate for the disruption of a single corridor through alternative routes or infrastructure.

However, a mitigating factor remains. The diplomatic channel between the United States and Iran does not appear to have been interrupted:
on 22 September, President Trump stated that talks were continuing and that he believed an agreement could be reached. The configuration should therefore not be interpreted as a linear trajectory towards escalation, but rather as a combination of high and persistent systemic pressure with diplomatic containment mechanisms still active.

As of 23 September 2026, the structural delta primarily concerns the greater observed capacity of the pressure generated by the Iranian node to propagate through functionally and geographically distinct vectors.

This reinforces Iran’s centrality within the Middle East–Mediterranean configuration without, in isolation, implying a change in the global systemic state or the need for a new GSA cycle.

Further reading: the updated MST assessment of the macro-area. Middle East.

Explore the related dynamics:

Hormuz Is Not Just a Strait

From Chokepoint to Systemic Tension

Systemic pressure in the Middle East–Mediterranean

U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA)