Israel as a systemic actor in the Middle East

Israel as a systemic actor in the Middle East

Deterrence, Iran, proxy networks and regional pressure

This analysis is part of a series dedicated to the role of Israel in the contemporary international system, structured across three dimensions: territory, region, and its relationship with the West.


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—> Israel and the West: alliance, dependence, and constraint

Israel is no longer merely readable as one of the actors in the Middle Eastern conflict. In the current strategic cycle, its function must be understood on a broader scale: Israel operates as a regional systemic actor, that is, as an actor capable of influencing not only its immediate security space, but the entire configuration of the Middle East.

Its significance does not depend solely on military power, technological superiority, or a privileged relationship with the United States.
It depends primarily on the fact that each of its strategic choices tends to produce effects that propagate beyond the bilateral or local level, simultaneously affecting regional deterrence, relations with Iran, the postures of Arab actors, Western strategic calculation, the dynamics of proxies, and the energy-logistical sensitivity of the system.

In this sense, Israel is not just an actor caught up in a crisis. It is one of the actors that help to define the shape of the crisis itself.

In contemporary Middle East, Israeli security does not end with the defense of the national territory. It projects outward through a logic of prevention, technological superiority, control of escalation, and, when deemed necessary, anticipation of the threat.
This approach produces a structural consequence: Israel tends to consider unstable not only what directly affects it, but also what could, in the medium term, alter the deterrence relationship to its detriment.

This is where Israel's role takes on a systemic quality. Its action does not simply react to regional instability: it often anticipates, compresses, redistributes or accelerates it.

The relationship withIran is at the centre of this dynamic. Tehran does not represent a conventional threat to Israel, but the possible architecture of a multi-level pressure built through missile program, regional projection, proxy capabilities, strategic depth, and nuclear potential. Consequently, the entire Israeli stance towards Iran does not respond to a logic of passive containment, but to a logic of strategic interdiction.

The developments of 2025 have made this logic even more evident. The June 13, 2025 Israel struck Iranian nuclear sites, missile factories and the top military command, in what Reuters described as a decisive escalation and a serious degradation of Tehran's military and nuclear leadership.
The Iranian retaliation and the subsequent series of reciprocal attacks showed that Israel acts not only as a deterrent actor, but also as a subject capable of simultaneously altering the calculus of Iran, its proxies, the United States, and its regional partners.

On February 28, 2026, this logic reached its most radical point. Israel and the United States launched a joint operation (Epic Fury for Washington, Roaring Lion for Israel), authorized by Trump after direct pressure from Netanyahu and based on Israeli intelligence described as a decisive factor. During the raids, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was killed; the Iranian government confirmed his death on March 1, and on March 8, his son Mojtaba Khamenei was designated as the new Supreme Leader.

This represents a qualitative leap compared to the logic of strategic interdiction described earlier: no longer the prevention or degradation of the enemy’s capabilities, but the direct elimination of the target state’s top leadership. Israel acts here not only as a multiplier of regional pressure, but also as an actor capable of redefining, with a single act, the leadership itself of its main antagonist.

The results remain contested. Official U.S. sources claim the destruction of more than 85% of Iran’s defense industrial base; independent assessments, however, estimate that Iran retains up to 70% of its pre-conflict missile arsenal. On the nuclear front, an intelligence assessment cited by the press suggests a delay in the program of less than six months, not its elimination; IAEA access to Iranian sites remains suspended as of February 28, 2026, and Tehran would still retain approximately 400 kg of uranium enriched to 60%. With Khamenei’s death, according to some analyses, his fatwa against nuclear weapons would also be nullified, leaving the new IRGC leadership with an open choice between conventional deterrence and nuclear rearmament.

A ceasefire mediated by Pakistan came into effect on April 8, 2026, but proved unstable: new clashes on June 7-8, a US-Iran memorandum of understanding signed on June 17 (which, among other things, provides for the cessation of hostilities in Lebanon, the end of Iranian restrictions on the Strait of Hormuz, and an economic reconstruction plan for Iran, with a 60-day window for the formal closure of the conflict) and further exchanges of attacks until the end of June 2026. The ceasefire-reactivation cycle confirms, rather than refuting, the article’s underlying thesis: Israel remains an actor that cannot afford to be merely reactive; the stakes have shifted from deterrence to the direct removal of the opposing leadership, with still open consequences for regional stability.

This produces a far-reaching effect. Any increase in tension between Israel and Iran tends to drag along a constellation of interconnected actors: Hezbollah, regional militias, US military assets, Arab partners, logistics corridors, energy flows, maritime space and perceptions of global risk.

Israel thus becomes one of the main pressure multipliers of the Middle Eastern theatre.

Its systemic centrality also stems from a second element: the ability to operate simultaneously on multiple levels. Israel is a military, technological, informational, and political actor. Its campaigns do not develop solely in the kinetic space. They involve deterrence, intelligence, targeting, narrative management, diplomatic pressure, and the redefinition of regional red lines.

This makes its action particularly impactful. In a region already fragmented, an actor endowed with high decision-making speed, informational superiority, and strong integration with its main strategic ally can produce systemic effects even without formally changing institutional balances. All it needs to do is modify the risk calculation of the other actors.

And that is exactly what is happening. Israel influences the behavior of Washington, stiffens or accelerates the choices of its regional partners, forces Iranian proxies to recalibrate their exposure, and pushes European actors to react to crises that they do not control but cannot ignore.

This does not mean that Israel controls the Middle East. It does mean, however, that in the regional system few actors have a comparable capacity to alter several domains simultaneously.

Its systemic role manifests itself in particular in four directions.

The first is the deterrence. Israel acts as an actor that continuously redefines the thresholds of the tolerable, both towards its direct enemies and towards regional actors that observe the balance of power.

The second is the regional propagation. Every crisis involving Israel tends to go beyond the national level and to involve related theaters, from Lebanon to Syria, to the dynamics of the Gulf and the Red Sea.

The third is the pressure on the United States. The strategic bond with Washington is not only a guarantee for Israel; it is also a channel through which regional crises can directly affect the American posture.

The fourth is the energy-logistical sensitivity. In a theater where deterrence, Iran, proxies, and chokepoints intertwine, Israel becomes indirectly an actor that also influences the perception of the stability of routes and markets. 

For this reason, reading Israel solely as “part of the conflict” is insufficient. Israel is one of the mechanisms through which the Middle Eastern conflict takes on a systemic form.

This also applies at the political level. The region does not react to Israel uniformly. Some actors perceive it as a threat, others as an implied partner, still others as an inevitable node of any possible regional realignment. But precisely this heterogeneity of perceptions confirms its centrality: Israel is not a peripheral actor around which secondary reactions revolve; it is one of the poles around which the regional strategic field is organized.

In this context, the classification of Middle East as a space of Active Systemic Rupture cannot be understood without considering the role of Israel.

The macro-area does not enter rupture only because of the presence of Iran, the proxies or energy fragility. It enters rupture because there is a continuous interaction between perceived threat, pre-emptive response, regional deterrence, infrastructure vulnerability and multi-domain propagation capacity. Israel is a central component of this interaction.

Naturally, this centrality does not imply omnipotence. Israel remains exposed to structural limits: reduced strategic depth, dependence on US support, simultaneous pressure on multiple fronts, international political cost, and the risk of military saturation.
Precisely for this reason, its action tends to be intense, preventive, and oriented toward preventing strategic inertia from working to the advantage of its rivals.

In other words, Israel acts as a systemic actor because it cannot afford a purely reactive posture.

Conclusions

This is the essential key. In the contemporary Middle East, Israel is not merely a state defending its own borders.
It is an actor that intervenes in the overall configuration of the theatre, alters its thresholds of risk, conditions its decision-making timelines, and amplifies its lines of fracture.

After Epic Fury, this statement must be understood in an even more literal sense: Israel no longer merely alters regional risk thresholds, but has demonstrated the capacity — together with its US ally — to physically remove the decision-making apex of its main regional antagonist. Any serious analysis of the macro-area must now treat Israel not as an accessory element of the crisis, but as one of its principal systemic organizers, and take into account this precedent and its still-evolving consequences for the Iranian leadership, the rearmament race and the durability of the June 2026 memorandum.

Update (late July 2026): the durability of the June memorandum, indicated here as an unknown, has found its answer. In late July the negotiated framework did not hold and the conflict widened to a new state actor, Saudi Arabia, with joint US–Saudi strikes on the Iran-aligned militias in Iraq. It confirms the propagation logic described here: the crisis revolving around Israel–Iran deterrence continues to redefine the postures of Arab actors and regional energy routes.

https://csr-italia.org/israele-come-attore-sistemico-del-medio-oriente/

Essential sources International Crisis Group, IISS, CSIS



Further reading: the updated MST assessment of the macro-area. Middle East.

These three dimensions do not exhaust the Israeli case, but they allow us to understand how an actor can simultaneously operate across territory, region, and decision-making architectures.

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